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"We are what is wrong, and we must make it right."1  
                                               
1 Al Gore, “Nobel Lecture”, delivered at the Oslo City Hall, December 10, 2007, online: Nobelprize.org 
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/gore-lecture_en.html>, accessed February 16, 
2014. 
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Abstract 
Climate change is one of today’s major challenges; a challenge with 
significant consequences that will affect all countries in different ways if a 
way to combat global warming by stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions 
cannot be agreed on. A global problem calls for an international response; 
however, the international climate regime has failed to deliver adequate 
results. Currently, states representing a mere 15 percent of global emissions 
have committed to legally binding emission targets under the second 
compliance period of the Kyoto Protocol, and the future of international 
cooperation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change remains undecided. 
This thesis recognizes that it is critical that more states take more stringent 
action to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in order to stabilize the 
climate. The EU has come a long way with its climate change mitigation 
action and has, in essence, been working to substitute for other states’ 
inaction on these urgent issues. Canada is an example of a country that has 
shown poor climate performance in recent years, and its government has 
clearly stated that mitigation efforts cannot come at the expense of the 
Canadian economy. This investigation therefore focuses on what legal 
measures that are available to the EU to exert pressure on Canada to 
pursue climate change action, in the light of an international climate regime 
that has failed to provide sufficient incentives and efficient mechanisms to 
ensure compliance with legally binding climate targets. 
Three different legal measures that the EU has implemented in order to spur 
climate change action beyond its external borders are examined in the thesis. 
First, secondary legislation with external implications has been used to 
impose requirements for access to the EU’s internal market, thus making all 
companies, regardless of nationality, subject to the EU’s high environmental 
protection standards. Second, CJEU case law in the form of the high-profile 
ATA case confirmed the legality of the criticized Aviation Directive, and 
legitimized the EU’s leadership role in climate change mitigation. Hence, if 
third countries want access to the EU market, they will have to accept the 
conditions that the EU sets up. Ultimately, the EU uses the size and 
importance of its internal market to make third countries take action that 
they would not otherwise have devoted resources to. 
The third measure explored is the possibility to condition bilateral and 
multilateral agreements on climate change action. By using conditionality 
or cooperation clauses, the EU can integrate climate change concerns into its 
external relations in a more flexible way, and tailor demands for specific 
action to selected countries. For this to work, it is crucial that the agreement 
is of high importance to the contracting state. In the newly concluded free 
trade agreement between the EU and Canada, Canada has for the first time 
agreed to include provisions related to trade and sustainable development, as 
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well as on trade and the environment, which is a step forward for a 
government otherwise reluctant to prioritize environmental protection. 
In times of institutional failure of the international climate regime, a range 
of alternative legal measures can be used by the EU to make third countries 
take climate action. Secondary legislation supported by CJEU case law can 
target a larger group, whereas conditionality and cooperation clauses can 
constitute tools for achieving political goals by negotiation, such as agreeing 
on more stringent climate change mitigation action. All measures should, 
however, be complemented with effective compliance mechanisms, as it 
seems that environmental benefits are not great enough incentives for profit-
driven companies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
 
3 
Sammanfattning 
Klimatförändringar är en av dagens stora utmaningar; en utmaning med 
betydande konsekvenser som kommer att påverka alla länder på olika sätt 
om vi inte kan komma överens om ett sätt att motverka den globala 
uppvärmningen genom att stabilisera utsläppen av växthusgaser. Ett globalt 
problem kräver internationell respons, men den internationella klimat-
regimen har misslyckats med att leverera tillräckliga resultat. Under Kyoto-
protokollets andra åtagandeperiod har stater som totalt står för bara 15 
procent av globala utsläpp förpliktat sig till att uppfylla juridiskt bindande 
utsläppsmål, och hur framtida internationellt samarbete under FN:s klimat-
konvention ska se ut är oklart. 
Den här uppsatsen konstaterar att det är avgörande att fler stater vidtar 
strängare klimatåtgärder för att minska utsläppen av växthusgaser så att 
klimatet kan stabiliseras. EU har kommit långt i sina klimatåtgärdsprogram 
och har arbetat för att de ska fungera som substitut i brist på andra staters 
agerande i dessa brådskande frågor. Kanada är ett exempel på ett land som 
på senare år har presterat väsentligt sämre i sitt klimatarbete och dess 
regering har tydligt uttalat att åtgärder för att stoppa klimatförändringar kan 
inte vidtas på bekostnad av den kanadensiska ekonomin. Den här 
utredningen fokuserar därför på vilka juridiska redskap som EU kan 
använda sig av för att utöva påtryckningar på Kanada att vidta klimat-
åtgärder. EU:s agerande måste ses mot bakgrund av en internationell 
klimatregim som har misslyckats med att skapa tillräckliga incitament och 
effektiva mekanismer för att säkerställa att de juridiskt bindande åtaganden 
som har gjorts faktiskt följs. 
Tre olika juridiska verktyg som EU har implementerat för att sporra 
klimatåtgärder utanför dess externa gränser undersöks i uppsatsen. För det 
första har sekundärlagstiftning med externa effekter använts för att införa 
villkor för tillgång till EU:s inre marknad. På så sätt har alla företag, oavsett 
nationalitet, tvingats rätta sig efter EU:s höga miljöstandarder. För det andra 
har rättspraxis från EU-domstolen bekräftat det kritiserade flygdirektivets 
lagenlighet i det uppmärksammade ATA-fallet och därmed legitimerat EU:s 
ledarroll inom klimatfrågor. Om tredje länder vill verka i EU:s inre marknad 
måste de följaktligen acceptera de villkor som EU ställer upp. EU använder 
alltså sin inre marknads storlek och betydelse för att tvinga tredje länder att 
vidta åtgärder som de annars inte skulle ha avsatt resurser till. 
Det tredje metoden som undersöks är möjligheten att villkora bilaterala och 
multilaterala avtal av att klimatåtgärder vidtas. Genom att använda 
villkors- eller samarbetsklausuler kan EU integrera klimatangelägenheter i 
sina externa relationer på ett mer flexibelt sätt och anpassa krav på specifika 
åtgärder till utvalda länder. För att denna metod ska fungera krävs dock att 
avtalet är av stor betydelse för avtalsstaten. I det nya frihandelsavtalet 
mellan EU och Kanada har Kanada för första gången gått med på att 
inkludera klausuler som rör handel och hållbar utveckling samt handel och 
 
 
4 
miljön, vilket måste ses som ett framsteg för en regering som annars varit 
motvillig att prioritera miljöskydd. 
I en tid av misslyckande för den internationella klimatregimen, finns ett 
antal juridiska verktyg som EU kan använda för att tvinga tredje länder att 
vidta klimatåtgärder. Sekundärlagstiftning, upprätthållen av EU-domstolens 
praxis, kan ta sikte på en större grupp medan villkors- och samarbets-
klausuler kan utgöra verktyg för att uppnå politiska mål genom förhandling, 
som till exempel överenskommelser om strängare klimatåtgärder. Alla 
metoder måste dock kompletteras med effektiva efterlevnadsmekanismer, 
eftersom miljöförbättringar i sig inte förefaller utgöra tillräckliga incitament 
för att få vinstdrivande företag att minska sina utsläpp av växthusgaser. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Context 
“First, I worry about climate change. […] It is the only thing 
that I believe has the power to fundamentally end the march of 
civilization as we know it, and make a lot of the other efforts 
we’re making irrelevant and impossible.”2 
These words were spoken by former United States President Bill Clinton at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos in January of 2006, and they are still 
important. Climate change is one of today’s greatest challenges, and one of 
the most, if not the most important environmental issue that the world is 
facing right now. One which has the power to completely change the world 
as we know it today. One with global consequences including flooding, 
reduced water supplies, declining crop yields, and millions of environmental 
refugees3.4 A global problem calls for an international response, and it is 
critical that all countries take stringent action to limit the deleterious impacts 
of climate change. 
The first steps towards international cooperation were taken in 1992, when 
countries took action to cooperate in order to limit the average global 
temperature by joining the first international treaty on climate change, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change5 (UNFCCC). 
The parties to the UNFCCC have since agreed that the increase in global 
average temperature should be limited to 2°C in comparison to pre-
industrial levels. A report from the United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) from 2013 states that “substantial and 
sustained reductions” of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are required in order to 
limit climate change.6 As GHG emissions continue to increase, climate 
stabilization and meeting the agreed 2°C target will become more costly, 
risky, and difficult.7 
It has become increasingly apparent that international climate negotiations 
have not produced desired results, with respect to countries come agreeing 
                                               
2 Bill Clinton, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 30 January 2006. The interview is 
available online, see “Davos Annual Meeting 2006 – Bill Clinton”, online: YouTube 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tdn5rH-643Y>, accessed February 16, 2014. 
3 An environmental refugee is a person who has been forced to leave his or her traditional 
habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of environmental disruption. 
4 Nicholas Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) at 56. 
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 
FCCC/INFORMAL/84, (entered into force 21 March 1994), [UNFCCC]. 
6 IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I Contribution 
to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 17, [IPCC (2013)]; A brief introduction 
to climate change processes will be offered below, see infra, subsection 1.1.1. 
7 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emissions Gap Report 2013: A 
UNEP Synthesis Report (Nairobi: UNEP, 2013) at x, [The Emissions Gap Report 2013]. 
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on mitigation issues. The attempt of getting states to commit to 
internationally binding targets under the Kyoto Protocol8 has resulted in 
only 25 percent of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions being covered for 
the first commitment period,9 and states representing a mere 15 percent of 
global emissions committing to the Protocol’s second commitment period.10 
In these times of international institutional failure, when international 
cooperation on climate change under the UNFCCC remains undecided, both 
regarding its legal shape and the details of its design,11 it is critical to find 
other solutions to climate change. Such alternative legal measures are what 
this thesis aims to explore. 
The European Union (EU) has in recent years shown great leadership in the 
issue of climate change, with ambitious emissions reductions goals and the 
introduction of an emissions trading scheme. This thesis will highlight 
climate change action that the EU, as the assumed leader on climate change 
mitigation, has taken, with a view to show different strategies that the Union 
has used in achieving its goals and its leadership role in climate change 
action. The thesis will have a specific focus on EU–Canada relations and 
will emphasize EU climate measures that have had implications for Canada. 
Canada will, for the purpose of this thesis, represent an industrialized 
country that has shown inadequate climate change performance in recent 
years, with respect to meeting its agreed emissions targets. In the 2014 
Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI), Canada was, for the second 
year in a row, ranked as the worst performer of all industrialized countries 
because of its lack of interest in developing its poor climate change policy.12 
Furthermore, in 2011, Canada became the first, and so far the only, 
signatory to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, meaning that Canada is no 
longer part of an international climate regime with binding climate targets.13 
The Kyoto Protocol has thus failed in creating incentives for its Parties to 
comply, not to mention even to remain, with the Protocol. 
The EU and Canada are in very different positions when it comes to 
mitigating climate change, and may have different incentives for 
implementing more or less stringent climate regulations. In 2011, Canada 
was the world’s sixth largest energy producer.14 The country is a net 
                                               
8 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 
December 1997, 2303 UNTS 162, (entered into force 16 February 2005), [Kyoto Protocol]. 
9 International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion – Highlights, 2013 
Edition, at 15. 
10 EurActiv, “Fatih Birol: Energy Efficiency Is One of the Last Options after Kyoto”,  
December 2012, <http://www.euractiv.com/energy-efficiency/fatih-birol-energy-efficiency-
op-news-516441>, accessed May 5, 2014. 
11 Kati Kulovsei, Elisa Morgera & Miquel Muñoz, “Environmental Integration and Multi-
Faceted International Dimensions of EU Law: Unpacking the EU’s 2009 Climate and 
Energy Package” (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 829, at 841, [Kulovesi, Morgera 
& Muñoz]. 
12 Jan Burck, Franziska Marten & Christoph Bals, The Climate Change Performance Index: 
Results 2014, (Germanwatch & Climate Action Network Europe, 2013) at 6, [CCPI 2014]. 
13 “Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, online: UNFCCC <https://unfccc.int/kyoto 
_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php>, accessed March 7, 2014. 
14 “Energy Production (kt of oil equivalent)”, online: The World Bank <http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/EG.EGY.PROD.KT.OE/countries>, accessed February 17, 2014. 
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exporter of energy, exporting about two thirds of its production,15 while the 
EU, on the other hand, is a net importer of energy, and depends on imports 
to supply more than half of the energy consumed within the Union.16 Being 
a major energy exporter, Canada’s economy is dependent on emissions-
intensive resource extraction, and a significant increase in emissions, 
especially from the oil and gas sector, is projected for future years.17 
Consequently, a reduction of GHG emissions would affect Canada’s energy 
production and, in turn, the Canadian economy. So is there something that 
can be done, in the absence of a binding international treaty, to give non-
committed industrialized countries incentives to act on climate change? 
What legal measures can the EU use to make Canada pursue more stringent 
climate change action? 
1.1.1 An Introduction to Climate Change 
Environmental problems are collective in nature; climate change is not the 
result of one individual’s actions or choices. Decision-making concerning 
the environment has to be carried out keeping this in mind, as it is usually 
not enough if legislation targets one isolated area.18 When studying and 
practicing environmental law, it is inherently imperative to have extensive 
knowledge of the legal framework and concepts that make up environmental 
law, but it is also essential to understand the environmental problems that 
give rise to the need for legislation.19 It is critical to appreciate how 
environmental problems and environmental law and practice interact,20 
because without environmental knowledge, the effects of environmental 
legislation cannot be accurately evaluated.21 Scientific uncertainty must 
always be considered, relating to either the cause of environmental harm, in 
this case the causes of global warming, or the assessment of what adverse 
effects a specific action, such as the emission of GHGs, has had on the 
environment.22 In order to get a better comprehension of climate change 
action, a brief description of the scientific phenomenon of climate change 
will therefore follow. 
Climate change can be caused by both natural processes and human 
activities. The Earth’s atmosphere causes a greenhouse effect that warms up 
the planet. This effect occurs naturally as not all of the sun’s thermal 
                                               
15 “Energy Imports, net (% of energy use), online: The World Bank <http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/EG.IMP.CONS.ZS/countries>, accessed February 17, 2014. 
16 “Energy Statistics”, online: Eurostat <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
energy/data/main_tables>, accessed February 17, 2014. 
17 Government of Canada, Canada’s Sixth National Report on Climate Change, 2014: 
Actions to Meet Commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2013) at 8, [Canada’s Sixth National 
Report on Climate Change]. 
18 Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange & Eloise Scotford, Environmental Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 24-25, [Fisher, Lange & Scotford)]. 
19 Ibid at 18-19. 
20 Ibid at 24-25. 
21 Ibid at 45. 
22 Ibid at 40-41. 
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radiation that reaches the Earth gets reflected back out into space. The 
atmosphere traps some of it on Earth, which warms up the planet and keeps 
it at about 43°C warmer than it would have been without this natural 
greenhouse effect.23 A number of gases, referred to as greenhouse gases, 
have the ability to raise the temperature near the Earth’s surface, because 
they absorb and trap thermal radiation.24 A higher concentration of GHGs in 
the atmosphere leads to more thermal radiation being trapped on Earth, 
which in turn contributes to and enhances global warming.25 
Human activities, such as emissions of GHGs due to combustion of fossil 
fuels, or changes in land use, for example in the form of agricultural 
practices or deforestation, enhance the Earth’s naturally occurring 
greenhouse effect as they contribute to an increase of GHG concentrations 
in the atmosphere, directly or indirectly. The IPCC’s latest assessment 
report on climate change concludes that it is extremely likely that human 
activities have been the dominant cause of the increase of GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere since the 1950’s, and the main reason for 
recent global warming.26 Climate change caused by human action is usually 
referred to as anthropogenic (human-induced) climate change.27 
Many anthropogenic GHGs have significant lifetimes, thus resulting in 
continuously high atmospheric concentrations of these gases. As a 
consequence, we would continue to see the effects of climate change for a 
long time even if emissions ceased today.28 Prompt and immediate action to 
limit emissions is therefore imperative if global warming is to be kept under 
2°C. For that to happen, a few countries’ commitment will not suffice. A 
global effort is needed where all actors contribute and take stringent action 
in the battle against climate change. 
1.1.2 The International Climate Regime  
The EU and Canada are both part of the international climate regime in the 
sense that they have both signed and ratified the main international treaty on 
climate change, the UNFCCC. The Convention was adopted in 1992, 
following the first IPCC scientific assessment report on climate change29, 
which presented scientific evidence underlining the importance of an 
international response to the climate change challenge.30 
                                               
23 Jonathan Cowie, Climate Change: Biological and Human Aspects, 2nd ed (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 6, [Cowie]. 
24 IPCC, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 87-88. 
25 Cowie, supra note 23, at 6. 
26 IPCC (2013), supra note 6, at 17. 
27 Ibid at 127. 
28 Ibid at 1106. 
29 IPCC, Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
30 “History”, online: IPCC <http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml>, 
accessed May 5, 2014. 
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In the preamble to the UNFCCC, the parties acknowledge their concern that 
human activities have contributed to a substantial increase of the 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and that this increase has enhanced the 
natural greenhouse effect. Moreover, the parties acknowledge that, since 
climate change is a global issue, it is critical that all countries cooperate and 
participate in an effective and appropriate manner, and that developed 
countries have to take immediate action.31 Consequently, these are standards 
that both the EU and Canada have agreed to uphold. 
While the UNFCCC only encourages stabilization of GHG emissions, by 
merely establishing broad principles and overall goals for combating climate 
change, more precise mitigation obligations were negotiated in the Kyoto 
Protocol, which was adopted in 1997 and requires action by imposing 
binding reduction obligations on developed countries.32 The Protocol 
entered into force in 2005, and currently has 192 parties, including the EU. 
Canada, as previously mentioned, withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 
2011, meaning that it no longer has a binding international climate target 
that it is obliged to meet. Institutional failure at the international level is 
evident, and no details for future action under the UNFCCC have been 
established. It is clear that other ways of making reluctant countries, such as 
Canada, take action must be found. 
1.2 Purpose and Objectives 
In the light of the facts that have been presented above, it can be established 
that the participation of all actors is needed in order to regulate climate 
change effectively. Climate change is something that is and will keep 
affecting all countries if emissions are not reduced. Still, it seems that 
climate issues are not prioritized by the Canadian federal government, and I 
am therefore interested in whether something can be done to make Canada 
take more action to mitigate climate change. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the EU, as the assumed 
leader on climate change issues, can use legal means to exert pressure on 
Canada to pursue climate change action. In order to achieve this purpose, I 
will use the following question as a basis for my research: 
What legal measures are available to the EU to exert 
pressure on Canada to pursue climate change action in 
times of international institutional failure? 
This question is significant to analyze as international institutional failure 
seems to be here to stay. In the absence of a functioning and efficient 
international climate regime, it is essential to find other ways to work 
through, as climate change is a global challenge and, due to its collective 
nature, a problem that cannot be solved by one nation alone. This thesis will 
                                               
31 UNFCCC, supra note 5, Preamble. 
32 Fisher, Lange & Scotford, supra note 18, at 639. 
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focus on finding the legal measures that will assist in achieving this 
objective. 
1.3 Methods and Materials 
In order to answer my research question, I will mainly be using traditional 
legal analysis, which is explained below; however, my thesis will also 
include a comparative aspect. When conducting research using a 
comparative method, different features and provisions in selected legal 
systems are compared in order to ascertain similarities and differences.33 
The findings can then be analyzed and evaluated with the purpose of getting 
a new perspective of the legal systems compared, hence leading to a better 
understanding and an unprejudiced point of view of different legal solutions. 
Consequently, comparative law is useful when working de lege ferenda, for 
example when working with law reforms.34 For the purpose of my thesis, 
the comparative element will illustrate Canada’s and the EU’s two different 
approaches to mitigating climate change, as well as possible shortcomings 
and areas of improvement in their respective climate change legislations. 
For this part, my approach will be positive, and describe the current state of 
the climate change policy and performance of Canada and the EU. 
To be able to conduct a comparative analysis, one must first establish the 
objects of comparison, and these must have a common denominator in order 
to carry out a meaningful comparison.35 In this case, the common feature is 
climate change policy, and I will hence research the federal Canadian laws 
as well as the EU laws on climate change.36 For that purpose I will be using 
traditional legal analysis, the so-called “black-letter” legal research method, 
in order to establish the two jurisdictions’ different approaches in combating 
climate change. 
Traditional legal analysis comprises the study of legal texts, hence the 
research of statutes, case law and secondary materials in the form of the 
relevant scholarship. My research will focus on three different legal 
measures that the EU can work through to exert pressure on Canada: EU 
legislation with external impact, case law, and bilateral agreements. More 
specifically, for the EU section, I will look into the EU’s climate laws, 
including an analysis of the legal framework of the EU’s emissions trading 
scheme (EU ETS) and documents from the European Commission, as well 
as the scholarship on EU climate change policy. I will also analyze the high-
profile case Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of 
State for Energy and Climate Change37 (the ATA case) from the Court of 
                                               
33 Michael Bogdan, Concise Introduction to Comparative Law (Groningen: Europa Law 
Publishing, 2013) at 5, [Bogdan]. 
34 Ibid at 16. 
35 Ibid at 46. 
36 Cf. ibid at 8. 
37 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines Inc, Continental 
Airlines Inc, United Airlines Inc v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 
[2011], OJ, C 260/9, [ATA]. 
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Justice of the European Union (CJEU), as my investigation demands an 
examination of the EU’s current policies and its stance on to what extent it 
can implement legislation with external impact. 
For the Canadian part, I will look into the Canadian Constitution38 to 
determine federal jurisdiction over the environment, in addition to a few 
cases from the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), which are used to clarify 
any ambiguities in the Constitution. Several federal acts on environmental 
issues will also be used in order to exemplify what type of climate action 
that the Canadian federal government has taken. 
Furthermore, I will use a number of policy documents and reports on 
climate change performance, as well as climate change assessments and 
statistics from different organizations and institutes, such as the UN, the 
IPCC, the World Bank and the non-profit, non-governmental environmental 
organization Germanwatch, which publishes the CCPI every year.39 I will 
use the reports to provide the thesis with independent, accurate and current 
data on climate change and climate change performance. The data will show 
whether or not the EU and Canada are on track to meet their climate targets, 
thus illustrating the need for more aggressive action on climate change. 
Finally, in an attempt to answer my research question, I will analyze the 
wording and examine the effect of conditionality clauses in place in current 
bilateral and multilateral agreements that the EU has drafted and signed. The 
technical summary of the final negotiated outcomes of the new free trade 
agreement (FTA) between the EU and Canada, the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), will be studied, as the final legal 
text has not yet been finished. I will conduct a normative analysis with a 
focus on how this FTA has dealt with environmental issues, and whether it 
has done so in an effective and stringent enough manner, or if additional 
conditions could have been included, against a background of the EU’s full 
legal ability to influence Canada to pursue climate change action. 
1.4 Delimitations and Scope of the Study 
This thesis discusses how the EU has used, and possibly can use, its 
leadership to influence other actors to pursue climate change action. While 
implications third countries40 will be mentioned, Canada will represent a 
concrete illustration of an industrialized country that has shown inadequate 
climate change performance, in relation to reducing GHG emissions, in 
recent years. It can therefore serve as a contrast to the EU, the assumed 
leader on climate change action, and as an actor that is in need of pressure to 
step up its climate game if emissions are to be stabilized. I have chosen the 
EU and Canada since both are Western, industrialized jurisdictions that are 
on different sides of the climate change performance spectrum. 
                                               
38 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, [Constitution Act, 1867]. 
39 “Mission Statement”, online: Germanwatch <http://germanwatch.org/en/mission-
statement>, accessed February 25, 2014. 
40 “Third countries” refers to states which are not part of the EU. 
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Consequently, it makes an interesting study to examine whether the better 
performer can influence, or even force, the poorer performer to take climate 
change action, in absence of a binding international document. 
To date, the climate change discussions have mainly concerned mitigation, 
which refers to taking preventive action in order to reduce emissions and 
prevent future climate change. This is also the aspect I will be focusing on 
for the purpose of this thesis. There is, however, another aspect of climate 
change policy, namely adaptation policies, which cover actions taken to 
adapt to the consequences of climate change.41 I have chosen to focus on 
climate change mitigation, as I am interested in the preventive part of 
climate change action. I see the mitigation aspect as of greater importance 
for the global community, as one country’s emissions affect and contribute 
to global warming, while adaptation measures are more of local relevance 
and deal with how a single country adapts after climate change 
consequences have occurred.42 Climate change adaptation will hence not be 
dealt with, due to the scope of the thesis. 
The thesis does not aim to be an exhaustive study of all of the EU’s and 
Canada’s climate policies. Rather, it serves to highlight in which ways the 
EU is working to become a leader in combating climate change and points 
to measures that exemplify how this objective has been carried out. It should 
also be noted that the study will focus on regulations at the federal level in 
Canada. Some of the provinces have shown more commitment and 
implemented more stringent measures to reduce GHG emissions, but the 
scope of this thesis does not allow for an in-depth investigation of these 
topics. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The four chapters following the 
introductory chapter each end with a subsection summarizing and 
commenting on the findings of that chapter. My own reflections are 
primarily kept to these, as well as to the concluding analysis in chapter six, 
however, they can occasionally be found elsewhere in the text. 
Chapter two starts off by setting the scene and offers an overview of 
challenges in regulating climate change and explains the current state of 
international institutional failure of the climate regime. To exemplify this 
statement, climate change action in Canada is examined. Its climate targets 
and performance are presented, and a brief introduction to federal 
jurisdiction over the environment in Canada is provided, in order to serve as 
a basis for understanding its current climate legislation. Chapter two 
                                               
41 Andrew Jordan et al, eds, Climate Change Policy in the European Union: Confronting 
the Dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010) at 20. 
42 This view is, however, quite narrow, as a lack of effective adaptation policies also can 
affect other countries, for example if climate change makes a country uninhabitable, and 
hence results in environmental refugees. 
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concludes with a study of how international climate change law is changing 
and what possibilities that change may provide. 
The third chapter focuses on the EU and its directional leadership through 
secondary legislation on climate change, and expands on the internal climate 
action that the EU has taken. The chapter aims to explain how the EU has 
been setting ambitious targets and how it has been demonstrating its 
commitment to combating climate change by implementing effective 
mitigation measures to tackle the global challenge while inspiring other 
actors to do the same. The most recent EU climate change policies and 
regulations in the form of the 2009 Climate and Energy Package are also 
mapped out. 
Chapter four moves to examine how the EU is taking its climate change 
action one step further, as it no longer seems enough to try to inspire other 
actors. Rather, a shift to structural leadership can be identified in the EU’s 
actions, which is exemplified by two measures through which the EU is 
working to exert pressure on third countries: EU secondary legislation that 
has had implications for external actors, and CJEU case law. The chapter 
includes an explanation of how the EU has used its internal market and its 
ETS as tools for making other states act on climate change, and discusses 
the external effects of two EU directives: the Aviation Directive, regulating 
the inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU ETS, and the Fuel Quality 
Directive, in which unprecedented sustainability criteria for biofuels have 
been introduced, and which has caused much controversy in Canada due to 
the way the EU has chosen to classify crude oil from the oil sands. 
Furthermore, the controversial ATA case, in which the validity of the 
Aviation Directive was upheld by the CJEU, is analyzed and its implications 
are discussed. 
In the fifth chapter, the third way of exerting pressure on third countries is 
explored: the possibility of conditioning bilateral (trade) agreements on 
climate change action. The current use of conditionality clauses in the EU’s 
external agreements is explored, as well as whether these types of clauses 
could be used for additional purposes. CETA is used as an example of an 
agreement that perhaps could have expanded more extensively on 
environmental issues.  
The concluding analysis, in the final and sixth chapter, summarizes the facts 
and observations presented in chapters two through five. The three different 
measures discussed are analyzed, and my conclusion on their effects is 
presented. 
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2 Setting the Scene: 
International Institutional 
Failure 
2.1 Challenges in Regulating Climate 
Change 
Climate change is an example of a collective-action problem, which has 
many different causes,43 and the world’s major emitters must cooperate if it 
is to be resolved. This is an important reason why individual states in 
general are reluctant to act unilaterally. Such action would be costly with 
minimal environmental benefits for that individual state.44 In the latest IPCC 
report on mitigation of climate change, the collective action aspect of 
climate protection is emphasized as a reason why international cooperation 
is necessary.45 This phenomenon corresponds with the idea of the tragedy of 
the commons, which Garrett Hardin discusses in his essay from 1968.46 
Hardin argues that any common resource, that is, a resource of free access, 
will be overused as the population increases – “freedom in a commons 
brings ruin to all”47. Accordingly, Hardin applies his theory to modern 
phenomena such as air pollution, arguing that a rational man realizes that it 
will cost him more to purify his wastes before releasing them, than to 
simply discharge the waste into the commons, thereby sharing the damage 
with everyone else.48 This reasoning can translate into the conclusion that 
incentives additional to long-term environmental benefits are needed to 
make states take more stringent climate change action. 
As the causes of climate change cannot be attributed to any specific state or 
actor, assumption of responsibility is another challenge.49 Who should pay 
the monetary price for the deterioration of the Earth? Traditionally, 
industrialized countries have been ascribed more historical responsibility, as 
their historical emissions have contributed significantly to the stock of 
current GHGs in the atmosphere. However, this standpoint has been subject 
to extensive criticism, where critics have argued inter alia that currently 
living people should not be held responsible for their ancestors’ actions. 
They have also argued that the adverse consequences of the emissions of 
                                               
43 Fisher, Lange & Scotford, supra note 18, at 24-25. 
44 William Hare et al, “The Architecture of the Global Climate Regime: A Top-Down 
Perspective”, 10 Climate Policy 600, at 602, [Hare et al]. 
45 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Working Group III 
Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Final Draft of Chapter 13, at 74, available at 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/>, accessed May 5, 2014, [IPCC (2014)]. 
46 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
47 Ibid at 1244. 
48 Ibid at 1245. 
49 Fisher, Lange & Scotford, supra note 18, at 31. 
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GHGs were unknown for a long time,50 hence that scientific ignorance or 
uncertainty of past times should not be a factor in today’s battle against 
climate change. The idea of historical responsibility is, however, reflected in 
the UNFCCC, which recognizes the common but differentiated 
responsibilities and capabilities of the parties and calls upon developed 
countries to take the lead in protecting the climate system.51 
Against this background, the international climate change regime can serve 
the purpose of ensuring reciprocity of effort, by setting legally binding 
commitments for all parties, and by providing a compliance mechanism.52 
This is, however, an area where the international regime has failed. Even 
though many states, including Canada and the EU countries, show an 
interest in climate change issues and claim to consider climate change as a 
threat of high importance, the fact is that there are still no signs that current 
climate policies have stabilized GHG emissions on a global level. Further 
delay in effective mitigation policies will make it difficult to keep global 
warming below 2°C.53 Global institutional failure is indisputable when no 
comprehensive international institutional framework has been produced,54 
and confidence in the international climate change regime is low.55 
Non-compliers such as Canada have not been dealt with effectively, and 
where compliance cannot be assured, incentives for cooperating will be 
weak. Canada is also an example of a country which, in addition to having 
withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol and abandoned its internationally 
binding climate targets, has shown poor performance in the climate change 
area in recent years.56 Its climate change regulations and actions will 
therefore be explored in the following subsections to illustrate what an 
industrialized country without binding commitments does to mitigate 
climate change and what has led to its decision to abandon its Kyoto target. 
The subsections furthermore serve to provide an overview and an 
understanding of the federal government’s approach to climate change and 
how it has chosen to deal with it by implementing different measures to 
reduce GHG emissions. 
                                               
50 IPCC (2014), supra note 45, Final Draft of Chapter 3, at 14. 
51 UNFCCC, supra note 5, Article 3. 
52 Daniel Bodansky, “A Tale of Two Architectures. The Once and Future U.N. Climate 
Change Regime”, 43:3 Arizona State Law Journal 697, at 709. 
53 Glen P. Peters et al, “The Challenge to Keep Global Warming Below 2°C” (2013) 3 
Nature Climate Change 4, at 4. 
54 See for example Daniel C. Esty & Anthony L.I. Moffa, “Why Climate Collective Action 
Has Failed and What Needs to Be Done Within and Without the Trade Regime” (2012) 
15:3 Journal of International Economic Law 777, at 781. 
55 Cf. Harro van Asselt, Michael Mehling & Clarisse Kehler Siebert, “The Changing 
Architecture of International Climate Change Law”, forthcoming in Geert Van Calster, 
Wim Vanderberghe & Leonie Reins, eds, Research Handbook on Climate Change 
Mitigation Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014) at 2, [van Asselt, Mehling & Kehler 
Siebert]. 
56 Cf. infra, subsection 2.2.1. 
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2.2 Canada and Climate Change: 
Inadequate Performance? 
2.2.1 Climate Targets and Performance 
The Government of Canada has had a number of different approaches to 
how climate change should be combatted and has revised its emissions 
targets several times in the past 25 years. In the 1980’s, Canada had a 
progressive approach to climate change, and earned somewhat of a 
reputation of being a leader on the issue, after hosting the first global 
conference on climate change in 198857, which marked the beginning of 
federal climate policy in Canada. At the 1988 conference, the Prime 
Minister at the time, Brian Mulroney (the Conservative Party), committed 
Canada to a 20-percent cut in GHG emissions by 2005, a pledge that was 
followed by the implementation of Canada’s first Green Plan which focused 
on energy efficiency and alternative energy sources.58 Canada then 
supported and ratified the UNFCCC, and its emissions target was revised 
and set to a return to 1990 levels by the year 2000, in alignment with the 
commitments of other developed countries in the UNFCCC.59 
The federal government’s commitment to combating climate change 
continued under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (the Liberal Party) and the 
Kyoto Protocol was signed and ratified. After much consultation, Canada’s 
Kyoto target was set to a 6-percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2012.60 
The government made sure to follow up on its set target by introducing an 
action plan that was designed to get Canada on track to fulfill its 
obligations.61 This action plan was never put in place, as a change of 
government stayed its implementation when the Conservatives regained 
power in 2006. At that time, Canada’s GHG emissions were 27 percent 
higher than in 1990, and the nation was nowhere close to meeting its Kyoto 
commitment. The Conservative government quashed the climate action plan 
introduced by the former Liberal government, and a new target was set at 
reducing emissions to 20 percent below 2006 levels by 2020.62 
With no action plan in place to reduce GHGs, and emission levels 
increasing, the federal government decided, in 2011, to withdraw from the 
Kyoto Protocol. Canada then became the first, and so far the only, signatory 
to withdraw from the Protocol. At the time of the announcement of the 
withdrawal, the government stated that the Kyoto Protocol had not been 
                                               
57 “The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security”, Conference, June 27-30, 
1988, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 
58 Government of Canada, Canada’s Green Plan for a Healthy Environment (Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada, 1990). 
59 National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE), Reality Check: 
The State of Climate Progress in Canada (Ottawa: NRTEE, 2010) at 28, [NRTEE]. 
60 Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol¸ supra note 8. 
61 Government of Canada, Project Green: Moving Forward on Climate Change: A Plan for 
Honouring our Kyoto Commitment (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005). 
62 NRTEE, supra note 59, at 29. 
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able to deal with the climate change issue in an effective way, as larger 
emitters such as the United States were not covered by the Protocol. 
Furthermore, Canada was facing large costs as it would have to purchase a 
significant amount of international credits in order to make up for not 
fulfilling its Kyoto obligations, and the government reasoned that these 
funds could be better used for investments within Canada.63 
Finally, the current (non-binding) target of reducing emissions to 17 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2020 was set following the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen, in alignment with the target set by 
the United States.64 Canada has chosen to do so as the United States is its 
main trading partner and the two countries have a very close energy 
relationship.65 
What Canada’s Copenhagen target means in practice is cutting emissions to 
612 Megatonnes (Mt) CO2 equivalent66 (CO2eq) per year. In 2011, Canada 
emitted 702 Mt CO2eq, which is 19 percent more than in 1990. During the 
same time period, Canada’s economy grew rapidly with a 65 percent 
increase of gross domestic product (GDP), resulting in an improvement in 
emission intensity (GHG emissions per dollar of GDP). Between 2005 and 
2011, Canadian GHG emissions decreased by 4.8 percent,67 but projections 
indicate that they will rise to 734 Mt CO2eq per year in 2020, with current 
measures in place. This is very close to the emissions level that Canada had 
in 2005 (737 Mt).68 In fact, emissions are projected to have decreased – in 
2020 compared to 2005 levels – in the electricity sector only. Emissions 
from all other economic sectors are projected to rise during this time 
period.69 This means that efforts actually made to mitigate climate change 
and reduce emissions within the electricity and transportation sectors will be 
neutralized by the lack of efforts in other sectors, resulting in total national 
GHG levels that do not change. This shows the importance of a 
comprehensive approach to mitigating climate change, on the national and 
the international level.  
                                               
63 “Canada’s Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol”, online: Environment Canada 
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&n=EE4F06AE-1&xml=EE4F06A 
E-13EF-453B-B633-FCB3BAECEB4F&offset=3&toc=hide>, accessed February 24, 2014. 
64 UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, UN Climate Change Conference 
2009, Copenhagen, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, Appendix I [Copenhagen Accord]. 
65 “United States–Canada Clean Energy Dialogue”, online: Government of Canada 
<http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/dialogue/default.asp?lang=En&n=C3D58516-1>, 
accessed April 9, 2014. 
66 Each greenhouse gas has a different global warming potential, that is, they do not 
contribute equally to the warming of the Earth. To be able to compare the different gases 
more easily, they can be standardized into CO2 equivalent. CO2-equivalent emission then 
refers to the amount of carbon dioxide emission that would cause the same warming over a 
given period of time, see Cowie, supra note 23, at 10-11. 
67 Canada’s Sixth National Report on Climate Change, supra note 17, at 4-5. 
68 Environment Canada, Canada’s Emissions Trends, October 2013, Figure ES 1 at 4. 
69 Canada’s Sixth National Report on Climate Change, supra note 17, Table 1.1 at 8. 
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2.2.2 Federal Jurisdiction over the Environment 
In order to investigate Canada’s current climate change action, the legal 
basis for federal climate legislation will first be examined, to see whether 
the problem lies at the legislative level, or if the Canadian legal system 
actually allows for stringent climate change laws. 
Canada is a federal state consisting of ten provinces and three territories. 
Legislative authority lies with the Parliament of Canada at the federal level 
and with the provincial legislatures at the provincial level. The legislative 
powers are distributed as listed in the Constitution Act of 186770 (the 
Constitution), where the powers of the federal legislature are established in 
Section 91 and the exclusive powers of the provincial legislatures in 
Sections 92 and 92A, under enumerated heads of powers. At the time of the 
first drafting of the Constitution, in the late 1800’s, the environment was not 
something that was widely discussed. Consequently, the environment is not 
listed in Sections 91, 92 or 92A. The SCC has clarified that the federal and 
the provincial parliaments have concurrent jurisdiction over the 
environment,71 but where there is a conflict between overlapping 
(constitutionally valid) federal and provincial laws, the federal one prevails, 
according to the doctrine of paramountcy.72 
Statutes are the most important source of law. However, as the Canadian 
legal system – with the exception of the province of Québec73 – is 
characterized as a common-law system, judge-made law or case law is a 
major source of law in Canada.74 The courts play another important role in 
the Canadian legal system, in the form of judicial review, which in essence 
concerns the accountability for governmental action, and the upholding of 
the rule of law. Judicial review proceedings can, for example, be used to 
force a government to regulate on a specific matter. One example is the case 
Friends of the Earth v Canada from 2008, in which the applicants sought 
relief on the grounds that the federal government allegedly had failed to 
comply with its duties under the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act75 
(KPIA), by declaring that it would not attempt to meet its emissions targets; 
thus essentially claiming that the government had violated federal climate 
change law.76 Canada then became the first country to be taken to court for 
                                               
70 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 38. 
71 Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport) [1992] 1 SCR 3. 
72 See for example Judge Major’s analysis in Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. (Trustee of) 
v Saskatchewan [2005] 1 SCR 188, at paras 11-14. 
73 The province of Québec is characterized as a civil law jurisdiction, as it is not based on 
the British tradition of common law, but rather on the French and Roman tradition of 
codification of law, see more in Gerald Gall, The Canadian Legal System, 5th ed 
(Scarborough, Ontario: Thomson Carswell, 2004) at 263-265, [Gall]. 
74 Ibid at 40-41. 
75 Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, SC 2007, c 30, [KPIA]. The KPIA was enacted to 
ensure that Canada meet its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. It was repealed on June 
29, 2012. 
76 Friends of the Earth v Canada (Governor in Council), 2008 FC 1183. 
 
 
21 
not complying with its legal commitments to mitigate climate change.77 The 
applications were, however, dismissed, as the Court concluded that the 
KPIA “must be interpreted as excluding judicial review over issues of 
substantive Kyoto compliance” and consequently that it was not up to the 
Court to review whether the government had acted reasonably or not in its 
response to Canada’s Kyoto commitments.78 
Canada was brought to court again regarding the Kyoto Protocol, in 2012. 
In Turp v Canada79, judicial review of the government’s decision to 
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol was sought on the grounds that Canada’s 
withdrawal from the Protocol was illegal, null and void as it was allegedly 
in violation of inter alia the KPIA. The application was, however, dismissed 
in Federal Court, as the Court concluded that the option to withdraw is 
provided by Article 27 of the Protocol and not removed by the KPIA, as the 
KPIA contained “no provision, condition or restriction that would limit the 
royal prerogative of the government to withdraw from the Protocol”.80 
These two cases are examples that show that there is an interest for climate 
change issues in Canada, and that there is no unanimity among the decision 
to withdraw from internationally legally binding climate commitments. An 
investigation of Canada’s past and current climate change action will point 
to the same conclusion – that political unwillingness is a major factor in 
Canada’s poor climate performance. As climate change can be regulated 
both at the federal and the provincial level, there are potentially plenty of 
opportunities for how Canada could tackle climate issues. The following 
subsections will now take a look at how the federal government has chosen 
to regulate on climate change. 
2.2.3 Current Climate Change Action 
The current federal government’s approach is that climate change action 
should be taken while keeping the Canadian economy strong; environmental 
benefits should not be acquired at the expense of the economy.81 At COP-19 
in Warsaw in 2013, the Canadian Minister of the Environment, Leona 
Aglukkaq stated that the Government of Canada supports the establishment 
of a climate change agreement, which includes commitments by all major 
emitters, however, stressing that such an agreement must “balance 
environmental protection and economic prosperity”.82 
                                               
77 Ecojustice Media Release, “Canada in court for violating federal climate change law”, 
June 18, 2008, online: Ecojustice <http://www.ecojustice.ca/media-centre/press-releases/ 
canada-in-court-for-violating-federal-climate-change-law>, accessed April 9, 2014. 
78 Friends of the Earth v Canada, supra note 76, at paras 44-46. 
79 Turp v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 893. 
80 Ibid at paras 25-26. 
81 Canada’s Sixth National Report on Climate Change, supra note 17, at 5. 
82 Leona Aglukkaq, “Canada’s National Statement at the 19th Conference of the Parties to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, delivered at COP-19 in 
Warsaw, Poland, November 20, 2013. 
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The Canadian government’s emphasis on the strength of the economy has 
led to the initiation of a “sector-by-sector” approach to combating climate 
change, instead of implementing nation-wide reforms, such as a carbon tax 
or a national emissions trading system. GHG emissions are thus regulated in 
one economic sector at a time.83 This way, regulations can be designed in a 
way that accommodates circumstances specific to individual sectors, which 
will result in long-term emissions reductions while maintaining economic 
competitiveness.84 So far, regulations have been implemented for the 
transportation and electricity sectors, which are two sectors with some of the 
highest emissions levels – 24 and 12 percent, respectively, of Canada’s total 
GHG emissions.85 For the highest-emitting sector, the oil and gas sector, 
which accounts for one quarter of Canada’s total GHG emissions,86 there 
are still no regulations in place. 
The main federal statute on the environment is the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act87 (CEPA), which regulates environmental activities that fall 
under federal jurisdiction. These include cross-border air pollution88 and 
environmental activities that take place on land owned by federal 
agencies89. Furthermore, CEPA gives authority to make regulations on 
GHG emissions, for example regulations related to the allowed quantity or 
concentration of substances released into the environment.90 
The federal government has not, however, taken this opportunity to set a 
national limit on the total amount of GHG-emissions level allowed. Instead, 
it is working through selected and isolated measures, according to its sector-
by-sector approach. In the transportation sector, regulations for light-duty 
vehicles were published under CEPA in 2010.91 These impose annual GHG 
emission standards to passenger automobiles and light trucks made between 
2011 and 2016. Amendments have since been proposed, for the inclusion of 
vehicles of later model years, beyond 2016.92 The vehicle regulations are 
aligned with U.S. Environment Protection Agency standards. Since the 
beginning of 2013, regulations are also in place for heavy-duty vehicles and 
                                               
83 Canada’s Sixth National Report on Climate Change, supra note 17, at 5. 
84 Ibid at 57. 
85 ”Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sector”, online: Environment Canada, 
<http://ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/default.asp?lang=en&n=F60DB708-1>, accessed 
May 6, 2014. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999, c 33, [CEPA]. 
88 Ibid, Sections 166-174. 
89 Ibid, Section 207(1). 
90 Ibid, Section 209(2)(a). 
91 Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations, 
SOR/2010-201. 
92 Regulations Amending the Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Regulations (Proposal), see “Backgrounder: Regulating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Light-Duty Vehicles (2017-2025), online: Environment Canada 
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=56D4043B-1&news=1F13DA8A-EB01-
4202-AA6B-9E1E49BBD11E>, accessed March 5, 2014. 
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engines, aiming to reduce emissions from vehicles such as trucks and buses, 
as well as vocational vehicles.93 
In the electricity sector, the federal government has taken steps to 
permanently shift to lower or non-emitting types of electricity generation.94 
A performance standard for coal-fired electricity generation has been 
introduced through regulations under CEPA and will come into force in 
2015.95 The adoption of these regulations makes Canada the first major coal 
user to ban construction of traditional coal-fired electricity generation 
units.96 
The federal regulatory approach is complemented by clean technology 
investments as well as provincial and territorial climate action,97 and there 
are several examples of provinces taking more stringent climate action than 
the federal government. Three ambitious provincial measures are worth 
mentioning, starting with British Columbia’s carbon tax98, implemented in 
2008 and still the only one of its kind in North America. The tax has been 
very successful with British Columbia reporting a decrease in fuel 
consumption by over 17 percent between 2008 and 2012.99 Second, the 
province of Québec has a cap-and-trade system100 for GHG emission 
allowances, which requires participation from any enterprise emitting more 
than 25,000 tonnes CO2eq per year,101 and third, the province of Ontario has 
decided to have all coal units in the province closed by the end of 2014,102 
thereby phasing out coal-fired electricity generation. This measure has 
contributed significantly to the reduction of total GHG emissions from 
Canada’s electricity sector,103 which shows the significance of moving 
towards a low-carbon economy in order to mitigate climate change. 
2.3 Alternative Possibilities: The 
Changing Nature of International 
Climate Change Law 
Canada and the EU have cooperated on environmental policies for almost 
40 years through the Canada–EU High-Level Dialogue on Environment, 
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under which experts from both Canada and the EU meet roughly once every 
eighteen months to discuss environmental issues and review policy and 
progress.104 At the Canada–EU Summit in 2010, adaptation to and 
mitigation of climate change were identified as key areas,105 and leaders 
from both sides emphasized that it was of great importance that a high level 
of ambition to tackle climate change was upheld.106 In a report from the 
2011 Summit, Canada and the EU confirmed that they both want to see a 
legally binding international agreement on climate change, which would be 
based on the commitments made at the COPs in Copenhagen and Cancun.107 
However, as a consequence of the current global institutional failure, the 
international legal climate change regime is now changing. It is no longer 
only up to the state and/or intergovernmental negotiations to set standards 
and conditions.108 International climate change law is gradually changing 
and in recent years an increasing support for regional as opposed to 
multilateral initiatives can be determined. Moreover, internationally binding 
commitments are replaced or supplemented by voluntary pledges.109 In 
times of institutional failure, this is an opportunity that the EU can use in an 
attempt to inspire other actors, such as Canada to take climate change action 
in other ways and for other reasons than for the sake of complying with 
international treaties in order to avoid heavy penalties. 
The UNFCCC was adopted more than 20 years ago, and annual meetings in 
the form of COPs have been held since 1995. Despite these international 
efforts, the results have been inadequate in terms of mitigating and 
stabilizing climate change. Currently, it is not very likely that the emissions 
gap, that is the difference between pledged emission reductions and the 
actual expected emission levels in 2020, will be closed by 2020.110 The 
Kyoto Protocol has 192 parties, but only establishes emissions targets for 36 
countries and the EU,111 and these do not include the major emitters such as 
the United States, China and India.112 For its participants, the Protocol’s 
compliance mechanisms are insufficient, clearly confirmed by Canada’s 
withdrawal. As a consequence, confidence in the international climate 
regime is low and international climate change law and policy is perceived 
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as ineffective.113 Steve Raynor identifies the problem as lying in the “top-
down” approach. This approach consists of policies and measures being 
defined by politicians, which has been the dominating strategy for dealing 
with climate change. Raynor argues that politicians are not always in the 
position to prioritize climate change issues over matters of more importance 
to their voters, and that a “bottom-up” approach, which originates from a 
national level, as opposed to the international climate regime’s supranational 
approach, would be better suited for developing climate policy. The bottom-
up approach would instead be based on a nation’s own capacities, in terms 
of institutions, technology, economy and politics,114 and supports a more 
voluntary approach to international climate policy, for example in the form 
of target pledges.115 The Copenhagen Accord is an example of the bottom-
up approach, as it allows each party to unilaterally specify its own targets 
and measures to achieve that set target. The Kyoto Protocol, on the other 
hand, represents the top-down architecture by defining emissions targets 
through international negotiations.116 William Hare, Claire Stockwell, 
Christian Flachsland, and Sebastian Oberthür, however, stress that because 
of the collective-action nature of the climate change challenge, there is a 
need for coordination of actions and approaches by countries, and a top-
down approach is the only way of effectively making countries commit to 
setting ambitious emissions-reduction targets.117  
At COP-17 in Durban in 2011, the parties to the UNFCCC agreed to 
negotiate a new agreement by 2015 that would be legally enforceable and 
applicable to all parties to the UNFCCC.118 Harro van Asselt, Michael 
Mehling and Clarisse Kehler Siebert stress the importance of the need of 
flexible and dynamic negotiations that can take into account changes in 
scientific insights as well as socio-economic and political conditions, and 
that it is essential that a balance is maintained between a top-down and a 
bottom-up approach to international climate policy.119 A balance resulting in 
national actions achievements of internationally agreed upon goals.120 
Another consideration is that climate change cannot be regulated in 
isolation, as climate change considerations permeate other areas additional 
to environmental law, such as international trade law and human rights law. 
The role of the UNFCCC in international climate change law needs to be 
reconsidered, according to van Asselt, Mehling and Kehler Siebert, as some 
issue areas might be better regulated by other institutions.121 The UN 
climate regime is, however, still important as it brings different countries 
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together in working towards a mutual goal while serving as a forum to keep 
climate change issues on the international policy agenda. In addition, it 
provides transparency through its monitoring, reporting and verification 
system as well as by allowing non-governmental observers to participate in 
negotiations.122 
Another aspect of the changing international climate change law is that 
courts are playing an increasingly important role. The emergence of climate 
change litigation can potentially be explained by global institutional failure 
and the slow progress under the UNFCCC; courts are thus used to fill a 
governance gap.123 There are different types of litigation related to climate 
change, and the concept can be defined as to relate to various aspects of 
climate change. Much of the international climate litigation concerns 
emissions trading schemes established to regulate GHG emissions,124 one 
example being the ATA case.125 This type of litigation is clearly a result of 
the limitations of the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance mechanisms, where 
national courts have to step in to substitute the shortcomings of the 
international climate regime. 
2.4 Reflections 
To summarize this chapter, it can be established that the international 
climate regime has been ineffective in recent years. There are no 
comprehensive international agreements imposing legally binding climate 
targets, and this fact is sometimes seen as proof of institutional failure. As 
explained, climate change is a transboundary challenge and collective action 
is needed. Developing countries have been reluctant to taking action as they 
do not see themselves as responsible for the problem occurring in the first 
place, and among these are emerging economies such as China and India, 
responsible for a significant share of global GHG emissions. In order to 
combat climate change, this type of reasoning is unsustainable. Reducing 
the emissions from a limited number of countries will not suffice. This 
reluctance to contribute to limiting atmospheric GHG concentrations lies not 
only with developing countries and emerging economies, but several 
industrialized countries have shown unwillingness to participate in global 
efforts to combat climate change. Among them is Canada, whose climate 
performance has been anything but desirable in recent years.  
Although Canada is no longer a party to the Kyoto Protocol, it does not 
mean that it has taken no climate action at all. It is still a party to the 
UNFCCC and hence subject to the Convention’s aspirational goals. Canada 
has expressed a willingness to act on climate change, most recently 
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confirmed by Minister Aglukkaq’s statement at the COP-19, and some 
measures have been implemented, among them emission standards for some 
automobiles and the banning of the construction of new coal-fired power 
plants, which is definitely a step in the right direction. However, it must be 
noted that the current government has made it clear that environmental 
protection cannot come at the expense of the economy. This standpoint 
materializes in the government’s decision to reduce emissions using a 
sectoral, as opposed to a nation-wide approach. The sector-by-sector 
approach allows for more flexibility in “customizing” climate change 
measures to target selected industries for emissions reductions. Furthermore, 
Canada has made sure to align any climate commitments with those of its 
main trading partner, the United States, so as to not put its industries at a 
competitive disadvantage.  
Canada still has a long way to go, and immediate, more aggressive, action is 
required if Canada is to reach its climate target. The Canadian government 
has through CEPA explicitly been given the competence to regulate with 
respect to limiting GHG emissions. In addition to this federal act, the 
Canadian Constitution authorizes the federal government to legislate on the 
environment. Consequently, the problem lies not in a lack of competence, 
but rather in a lack of political will. The federal government should take the 
opportunity to be inspired by provincial climate action, as there are several 
examples of successful progress on reducing GHG emission at the 
provincial level. 
Currently, Canada is looking at a 0-percent reduction of its GHG emissions 
by 2020, rather than the 17-percent cut that it has committed to under the 
Copenhagen Accord. All commitments under that agreement are, however, 
non-binding, and the current Conservative government has already proved, 
by withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, that fulfilling Canada’s climate 
commitments is not a priority. Moreover, Canada does not seem to have a 
problem in adjusting its climate targets or its international agreements, if 
efforts to limit GHG emissions are not enough. When the government 
realized that it was nowhere near reaching its Kyoto Protocol in the years 
leading up to 2012, it decided to withdraw from its commitments, rather 
than to pay the fines, or, even better, to step up its climate game and 
implement more stringent measures.  
Even though global action is needed in order to conquer a global problem, 
international agreements may not be the only solution. It can be questioned 
whether a legally binding climate target would make any difference to 
Canada’s climate performance. As presented in this chapter, new ways of 
regulating climate change are emerging, and it is suggested that working 
with voluntary pledges rather than with legally binding commitments is 
feasible. Judging by Canada’s actions, and drawing from the analogy of the 
tragedy of the commons, it seems that additional incentives are needed for 
individual actors to see beyond immediate economic profit. The Canadian 
federal government has the legal competence needed to legislate on GHG 
emissions in an efficient manner, but the sector-by-sector is not a 
progressive one that will inspire other states, but rather, it is a strategy for 
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not having to deal with emissions from the heavily emitting, yet very 
profitable, oil and gas sector. This strategy will allow this sector to stay 
unregulated for a little longer, as the government can point to measures 
implemented in the transportation and energy sectors. Regulating emissions 
from these sectors is most definitely of high importance, but one cannot 
ignore that it also gives the government an excuse to divert attention from 
the fact that the industry responsible for 25 percent of Canadian emissions is 
still free to emit heavily with no consequences at the federal level. 
The Canadian cases Friends of the Earth v Canada and Turp v Canada 
show that there are forces in Canada which are ready to fight for the climate, 
but the courts appear reluctant to get involved in the issue, and seem to want 
to leave the challenge to be tackled on a political level. 
As one of the world’s biggest energy producers, Canada would prove an 
important point and show other producers the significance of sustainable 
energy production by stepping up and taking responsibility for its GHG 
emissions. Its current approach may even de-motivate others to adopt a 
progressive climate change policy.126 These observations leave us with the 
conclusion that much of the challenge in combating climate change lies in 
political unwillingness to act, plausibly because this type of regulations will 
be costly and not necessarily immediately economically rewarding. The new 
possibilities that the changing architecture of international climate law 
brings, where alternatives to top-down approaches are emerging, should be 
further explored to find alternative solutions. Having set the scene for this 
thesis, the next chapter will examine the EU’s leadership in climate change 
action, and what legal measures the Union has implemented to mitigate 
climate change and how it has taken advantage of these times of change in 
international climate law to inspire other countries to take similarly stringent 
climate action. 
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3 The EU and Climate Change: 
Leading by Example 
3.1 Promoting Climate Change Action 
through Directional Leadership and 
Secondary Legislation 
Ever since the beginning of the 1990’s, when negotiations leading up to the 
UNFCCC were initiated, the EU has positioned itself as an international 
leader in climate change action. The Union has shown strong support for 
and promoted the adoption of a new international comprehensive agreement 
on climate change including binding international commitments.127 The EU 
has high ambitions for combating climate change and it is and has been 
trying to inspire other actors to take action by implementing stringent 
domestic measures and setting ambitious climate targets, which I will 
exemplify in the following subsections. In its long-term objective to carry 
out a transition to a low-carbon economy, the EU has already introduced a 
GHG target for 2050, set to cutting emissions by 80-95 percent compared to 
1990 levels. This target is considered necessary if climate change is to be 
kept below 2°C.128 
The climate change measures addressed are not an exhaustive enumeration 
of all climate change action that the EU has taken, but are intended to 
highlight the important parts in the EU’s directional leadership. Directional 
leadership is a term used in international relations scholarship,129 and refers 
to taking unilateral action and implementing domestic measures in order to 
demonstrate one’s own commitment as well as the feasibility of proposed 
policy solutions – essentially leading by example. This is the primary 
approach that the EU has taken when aspiring to assume leadership in 
climate change policy.130 
One important aspect of the EU’s directional leadership, which will be 
expanded on in the following subsections, is that the EU has continuously 
set tougher targets and implemented more stringent measures for its climate 
change policy than what has been suggested in the international climate 
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regime, and then delivered on those targets and used its climate policies 
effectively. The EU must fulfill international promises if it wants to 
maintain its leadership role in global climate change action.131 The 
following subsections will focus on how the EU has worked with integrating 
the environmental aspect into its legislation and policies, as well as what 
emissions targets it has set for itself. In addition, they will highlight 
important parts of the EU’s current climate change action, which aims to be 
efficient tools in combating climate change, as well as to inspire other 
countries to pursue similar action.  
3.2 Legal Basis and Environmental 
Integration 
Protection of the environment is of great importance to the EU and this is 
apparent as it is mentioned in both pieces of EU primary legislation and 
included among the general principles of EU law. Article 3(3) of the Treaty 
on European Union132 (TEU) focuses on the domestic aspect and states that 
the EU’s internal market shall “work for the sustainable development of 
Europe”, as well as that it shall aim at a “high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment”, while Article 3(5) TEU 
enhances that the EU shall promote sustainable development in its external 
relations. Accordingly, this has been confirmed by the CJEU, which has 
ruled that environmental protection is one of the EU’s “essential 
objectives”.133 
Moreover, the environmental integration principle in Article 11 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning European Union134 (TFEU) states that 
environmental protection requirements must be integrated into all EU 
policies and activities. By framing the provision in mandatory terms, the 
legislator has emphasized its importance, perhaps even intending it as 
imposing a legal obligation.135 
More specific environmental provisions are found in Articles 191-193 
TFEU, which make up the Environmental Title. Article 191(1) TFEU 
establishes four objectives for EU environmental policy, one of them being 
the promotion of “measures at international level to deal with regional or 
worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate 
change” [emphasis added]. The climate change aspect was added through 
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the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon136, which entered into force on 
December 1, 2009. This addition of an explicit reference to climate change 
as one of the objectives of the EU environmental policy can be interpreted 
as that which facilitates and opens up the possibility for the EU to take on an 
international leadership role within the climate change policy area.137 
In addition to the Environmental Title of the TFEU, Article 114 TFEU 
establishes EU competence for environmental action regarding measures 
related to the establishment and the functioning of the internal market, thus 
allowing for such legislative action to have an environmental protection 
aspect, and requiring those measures to be based on a “high level of 
protection”, as stated in the TEU.138 How these objectives have been applied 
in EU climate change legislation will be explored below, after the EU’s 
climate change targets and current performance have been presented. 
3.3 Demonstrating Commitment by 
Setting Ambitious Climate Targets 
The EU acknowledges that climate change is a huge challenge, but it is 
committed to making Europe the most climate-friendly region in the world 
by continuing EU leadership in combating climate change.139 At the latest 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), in Warsaw in November of 
2013, the EU Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard, stated 
that empty agreements are not enough when it comes to climate change – it 
is commitments and actions that matter, and if the set climate target is not 
met, the target cannot be changed. It is the policies implemented to achieve 
the target that have to be changed, or amended140 – a standpoint that can be 
contrasted with that of Canada, which, as explained, has adjusted and 
changed its climate targets several times. 
The EU’s set climate targets reflect the its commitment to tackling climate 
change and to taking climate action. First of all, for the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012), Article 3 of the Protocol required 
all Annex I parties to reduce their emissions by at least 5 percent. The EU 
and its fifteen Member States at the time141 (EU-15), however, committed to 
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reduce their GHG emissions by an additional three percentage points, and 
set their target at reducing emissions by 8 percent by 2012, compared to 
1990 levels.142 The EU was not content with a 5-percent reduction, and 
showed that it had higher ambitions than what was required by going 
beyond what had been agreed to by the international community. The EU’s 
total GHG emissions levels have been below that 8-percent Kyoto target 
since 2009.143 
At the COP in Copenhagen in 2009, the EU yet again demonstrated its 
commitment, when the Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed, under 
the Copenhagen Accord,144 to submit non-binding economy-wide emissions 
reductions targets for 2020.145 The EU made a conditional commitment and 
set up a target of a 20-percent cut in emissions compared to 1990 levels, 
unless other developed countries would make similarly stringent 
commitments, preferably under an international treaty.146 In that case, the 
EU would increase its target to a 30-percent reduction.147 The conditional 
target was a way for the EU to try to get other actors to take more aggressive 
climate action. 
Negotiations at the COP in Doha in 2012 resulted in a second commitment 
period being launched under the Kyoto Protocol through the Doha 
Amendment148, however, only some developed nations, including the EU, 
agreed to setting up new reduction targets during this extended commitment 
period of eight years (2013-2020). The EU committed to a reduction of 
GHG emissions of 20 percent by 2020, with 1990 as the base year. As with 
its commitment under the Copenhagen Accord, the EU stated that it would 
move to a 30-percent reduction target, provided that other developed 
countries would make comparable commitments.149 In a press release, the 
European Commission explained that even though the EU had already 
implemented these emissions reductions, ratifying the Doha Amendment, 
thus making its pledges legally binding, it would show the EU’s and its 
Member States’ commitment to tackling climate change at the international 
level, as well as demonstrate its support for a legally binding international 
agreement on climate change.150 
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Currently, the EU has a climate and energy policy that has set up the so-
called “20-20-20” targets for 2020, in the form of three key objectives, 
which are all aimed at meeting the EU’s international climate targets under 
the Copenhagen Accord and the Kyoto Protocol: 
 GHGs to be cut by 20 percent compared to 1990 levels 
 Renewable resources (such as wind, solar, and biomass energy) to 
make up for 20 percent of the total energy production 
 Energy efficiency to be improved by 20 percent151 
The latest reports, with figures from 2011, show a decrease of 18.4 percent 
in total GHG emissions in the EU-27 (Croatia joined the EU as the 28th 
Member State in 2013) between 1990 and 2011.152 Furthermore, renewable 
energy made up 13 percent of total energy consumption.153 In the 2014 
CCPI, however, Germanwatch and Climate Action Network Europe pointed 
out that the EU had not yet developed an efficient way of using the fight 
against the economic crisis as a tool for environmental protection, and that 
the EU is no longer in the lead when it comes to implementing ambitious 
climate policy on a national level.154 
3.4 The EU ETS 
The EU established its emissions trading scheme in 2005, which is now its 
key tool for reducing industrial GHG emissions in a cost-efficient way,155 
and could potentially be called the world’s most important GHG emissions 
trading scheme, because of its high value.156 The Scheme now limits GHG 
emissions from more than 11,000 installations, including power plants, oil 
refineries and civil aviation, and covers around 45 percent of the EU’s total 
emissions.157 By putting a price on the emission of GHGs, the EU aims to 
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integrate climate change considerations into the covered sectors, which are 
all energy-intensive.158 The objective is to stimulate innovation and to create 
an incentive for these industries to start investing in low-carbon 
technologies,159 and can be understood as an internalization of some of the 
costs for climate change.160 
The EU ETS was established through the ETS Directive161 as the world’s 
first cap-and-trade system for CO2 and other GHG emissions,162 meaning 
that a limit is set on how much GHGs that installations are allowed to emit. 
Within this cap, which equals the total number of allowances under the EU 
ETS, companies receive emission allowances to sell or buy from one 
another.163 One allowance gives the right to emit one metric tonne of 
CO2eq.164 The cap is decreased every year, to make sure that the total 
amount of emissions is correspondingly reduced over time.165 At the end of 
each year, each company must surrender enough allowances to cover all of 
its emissions. Should a company’s emissions exceed its allowances, fines 
will be imposed, now set to 100 euros per tonne CO2eq exceeding the 
amount of allowances surrendered.166 Any surplus allowances can be saved 
to cover future needs, or sold to another company that is short of 
allowances. Consequently, by buying allowances from the market, 
installations can emit more than they have been allocated without the 
environment being more adversely affected, since the total amount of 
allowances that can be allocated is fixed. 
Prior to 2013, the majority of emission allowances were given away for free 
to companies, a method referred to as “grandfathering”. However, this did 
not create a great enough incentive for industries to actually cut their 
emissions.167 Several problems can be identified in relation to 
grandfathering, a significant one being that allowances may be over-
allocated, and companies would thus receive more allowances than they 
actually need, which means that market price would not be paid for 
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allowances. In addition, over-allocation could constitute state aid, if seen as 
an advantage received from the state which the companies do not have to 
pay for.168 
The intention is now to gradually phase out free allocation, thereby to make 
sure that the Polluter Pays Principle is practiced.169 In 2013, the EU ETS 
moved to its third phase with an amendment170 to the ETS Directive, as part 
of the 2009 Climate and Energy Package, which will be expanded on in the 
following subsection. 
3.5 The 2009 Climate and Energy Package 
The most recent EU climate change policies and regulations have been 
implemented through the 2009 Climate and Energy Package. With this set 
of climate change regulations, the EU is preparing for the transition towards 
a low-emission economy. The EU wants to lead the way in showing that 
climate change policies can be implemented without slowing down 
economic growth.171 I will highlight three different elements included in the 
Package, which show the EU’s leadership ambitions, each of which is a tool 
in achieving the 20-20-20 targets: a reform of the EU ETS,172 the 
Renewable Energy Directive,173 aiming for renewable energy to make up 20 
percent of the total energy consumption, and the Carbon Capture and 
Storage Directive,174 which establishes a legal framework for the 
environmentally safe use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. 
These three parts of the 2009 Climate and Energy Package will now be 
explored further, as they are good examples of the EU’s aspiring leadership 
role in climate action. 
First of all, the reform of the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is 
carried out in the form of amendments intended to strengthen the scheme.175 
The Revised ETS Directive confirmed the EU’s previous intentions to 
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continue its emissions trading system regardless of whether or not there 
would be a second compliance period under the Kyoto Protocol.176 
The revised ETS Directive introduced several new features. First of all, the 
over-allocation problems that the previous allocation method of 
grandfathering had caused177 are intended to be erased by using auctioning 
as the main method for allocating allowances.178 Second, a number of 
additional industries were included in the Scheme – the one attracting the 
most attention being the inclusion of the aviation sector.179 Third, the 
revised ETS Directive encourages commitment and climate change 
responsibility outside the EU, by stating that at least 50 percent of the 
revenues generated from the auctioning of emission allowances should be 
used for investing in one or several of nine enumerated projects related to 
climate change adaptation or mitigation.180 The list includes projects in 
developing countries, such as measures to increase reforestation,181 meaning 
that the EU uses its own emissions trading system in order to encourage   
financing of projects to combat climate change in third countries.182 It is an 
example of how legislation can be used to generate climate funding for both 
domestic and international purposes at the same time.183 
Last, the revised ETS Directive provides an opportunity to link the EU ETS 
to other, compatible schemes in third countries.184 The possibility of linking 
the EU ETS to other, comparable schemes aiming to reduce GHGs, that the 
revised ETS Directive provides for could eventually lead to the creation of a 
global carbon market.185 As far as Canada is concerned, a cap-and-trade 
system does exist at the provincial level, in Québec, as previously 
mentioned,186 consequently opening up for an opportunity to connect the 
two systems. 
Second, the EU stresses that the renewable energy sector is labor intensive, 
more specifically, that the target of a 20-percent share of renewable energy 
of the total energy consumption is estimated to amount to a million jobs in 
the renewable energy technology industry by 2020.187 As a consequence, the 
Renewable Energy Directive was implemented as a part of the 2009 Climate 
and Energy Package. The Directive sets binding national targets for the EU 
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Member States in order to meet the 2020 renewables target.188 In addition, 
the Directive introduces unprecedented sustainability criteria for biofuels, 
which entail consequences for third countries. This will be expanded on 
below.189 
The third element of the Package is the Carbon Capture and Storage 
Directive (CCS Directive), which establishes a legal framework for the 
environmentally safe use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technologies.190 CCS refers to the capture of CO2 emissions for storage 
underground where it does not contribute to global warming and is a 
technology with great mitigation potential. The capture process is, however, 
quite costly and requires large amounts of energy. In addition, a big concern 
is the safety and environmental risks that the CCS technology is associated 
with, as well as the risk that CO2 could leak back to the atmosphere. Close 
monitoring of the storage is therefore essential.191 The EU still believes that 
the technology is necessary if global warming is to be kept below 2 
degrees,192  albeit it does not support all CCS projects, as some are believed 
to involve deleterious impacts on the environment. The EU has furthermore 
shown its environmental concern by stressing that the development of CCS 
technology should not come at the expense of other safe and sustainable low 
carbon technologies, and that CCS can only be used as a mitigation option 
among others, if environmental protection can be ensured.193 
With the CCS Directive, the EU wants to inspire other industrialized 
countries to take the lead in developing and deploying these technologies. It 
has also proposed that CCS be included in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism194 (CDM), to involve developing countries and to 
create an incentive for them to invest in low-carbon technologies.195 
With the 2009 Climate and Energy Package, the EU shows progressiveness 
on climate change mitigation. It implements stringent measures which 
recognize the opportunities of new technology, and the potential for creating 
jobs while increasing the share of renewable energy, in order to significantly 
reduce GHG emissions by 2020, according to the EU’s climate targets. 
Furthermore, the Package is followed up by the 2050 roadmap196 to make 
sure that the EU moves to a “competitive low-carbon economy” by 2050, 
thereby showing the Union’s commitment to ensuring the effectiveness of 
its legal measures. In addition to the 2050 Roadmap, the Commission has 
proposed a framework for 2030, to support continuous climate action after 
                                               
188 Renewable Energy Directive, supra note 173, Article 3. 
189 See infra, subsection 4.6.2.  
190 CCS Directive, supra note 174. 
191 Bert Metz, Controlling Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010) at 138-141. 
192 CCS Directive, supra note 174, Preamble, Recitals 3-5. 
193 UNFCCC, “Views related to carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological 
formations as a possible mitigation technology”, Submission from Parties, 13 April 2010, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2010/MISC.2, at 32, [UNFCCC, Submission from Parties]. 
194 Cf. infra, subsection 4.5. 
195 UNFCCC, Submission from Parties, supra note 193, at 32-33. 
196 2050 Roadmap, supra note 128. 
 
 
38 
2020 and make sure the EU’s progress towards long-term climate objectives 
is secured.197 
3.6 Reflections 
The objective of this chapter is to show how the EU has worked to inspire 
other states and actors to take climate action in the absence of a functioning 
climate regime. Although the EU has pushed for the adoption of a 
comprehensive international agreement that would impose legally binding 
commitments on a global level, it has been forced to look to alternative 
solutions for making other countries commit to reducing GHG emissions. In 
this chapter, selections of the EU’s climate policies that are part of its 
directional leadership have been examined. First of all, it can be established 
that the EU has aimed to implement environmental aspects in all parts of its 
policies, both domestic and international ones, clearly demonstrated by the 
environmental integration principle in the TFEU. This comprehensive 
approach is easy to distinguish from the Canadian sector-by-sector 
approach, which does not recognize the importance of acknowledging all 
aspects of climate change causes.  The EU’s addition of climate change as 
an explicit environmental objective furthermore shows that the EU is 
committed specifically to tackling global warming, to the point where it 
cannot just fall under general environmental concerns, but deserves to be 
emphasized as an important objective of its own. 
Time after time, the EU has set higher climate targets than other countries, 
thereby trying to set an example, which, however, few other countries have 
followed. The EU ETS serves an important purpose in this aspect, as it 
forces actors on the internal market to participate if the industry is listed in 
the ETS Directive, regardless of its nationality. 
The effectiveness of the EU ETS has, however, been subject to debate, 
especially in relation to its allocation system. It has also been criticized for 
not providing industries with effective incentives for reducing their 
emissions, so the question is whether the Scheme is a functioning strategy? 
Carbon markets can be flexible tools in combating climate change. By 
internalizing external environmental costs, carbon markets let the polluters 
pay for the damage they are actually causing, but it is important to note that 
several issues can be raised as deficiencies of environmental markets in 
general. One example is that they are economic instruments and thereby 
designed to maximize economic efficiency, rather than to create 
environmental solutions.198 However, this fact does not necessarily make 
carbon markets unsuitable as tools in combating climate change. The idea is 
that an actor that is successful in reducing its emissions should be able to 
trade any surplus allowances that have been left over with a less efficient 
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actor. This way, companies that are successful in reducing their emissions 
will make a financial gain without causing more environmental harm than 
“necessary”, as long as the total amount of allowances is within the cap. A 
way of ensuring proper use of this financial gain is to have the companies 
that have reduced their emissions use their profit to invest in innovative 
solutions, such as green technology. Moreover, it should be costly for 
industries to emit more than they have been allocated, that is, a functioning 
compliance mechanism is critical. As long as possible problems are 
identified and the markets are used properly, these trade-based mechanisms 
can consequently force the polluters into more sustainable behavior. For this 
to work, however, it is significant that the cap of the total amount of 
emissions allowed is set accurately and that over-allocation is avoided. It is 
therefore promising that the EU has decided to switch over to auctioning as 
its main method for allocating allowances, instead of the previous 
grandfathering method. 
The concern that the EU can no longer be seen as a strong leader in climate 
policy could perhaps be connected to the expansion of the Union to 28 
states, which potentially could make it more difficult to act as a united 
entity. By committing to a second compliance period under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the EU has, however, proved that it will not step down even 
though other major emitters, such as the United States and China, are not 
part of any binding international climate agreement. The EU is well on track 
to meet its own climate targets while at the same time encouraging other 
developed nations to step up their climate change game. Linking the EU 
ETS with Kyoto measures creates incentives for companies to invest in 
projects that may lead to reduced emissions outside of the EU, and opening 
up the possibility to link the system to other schemes shows ambition to 
create a global carbon market. 
With the 2009 Climate and Energy Package, the EU has taken important 
steps towards a transition to a low-carbon economy. It has taken note of the 
criticism of the EU ETS and implemented measures intended to deal with 
those problem areas. In addition, new technology in the form of CCS is 
addressed, the EU ETS has been supplemented with the Effort-Sharing 
Decision, and the potential for creating new jobs within the renewable-
energy sector is emphasized. These efforts show that the EU is prepared to 
work with different approaches and in different sectors at the same time, in 
order to reduce GHG emissions efficiently. 
An examination of the EU’s current climate performance shows that its 
climate measures seem to be working domestically. The Union’s total 
amount of GHG emissions is decreasing, which naturally is an objective for 
the EU’s climate policies. However, its intention to inspire other countries 
to implement similarly stringent measures has not been as successful, and as 
a result, other options have to be explored. The next chapter will therefore 
investigate how some EU climate action has forced third countries to 
commit to the same conditions as the EU’s own Member States. 
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4 Spurring Climate Change 
Action Beyond External 
Borders 
4.1 Overview 
The EU has been aiming to take on a leading role in combating climate 
change for the past twenty years, however, its efforts have not been as 
successful as hoped for, and few countries have followed the EU’s 
initiatives and implemented equivalent, national climate change 
legislation.199 To be mentioned is, however, that there are examples of cap 
and trade systems being launched in other parts of the world, which opens 
up the opportunity for creating an international carbon market. The EU has 
for example announced that it will link the EU ETS with Australia’s 
emissions trading system, as a step towards an expanded international 
carbon market. This means that, under the agreement, covered businesses 
will be able to use carbon credits from both systems for compliance under 
either one.200 
This type of progress is, however, unfortunately not evident in all parts of 
climate change mitigation efforts. COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 is often 
depicted as a failure for the international climate regime.201 The Conference 
was expected to result in the international community signing an 
international treaty of effective climate targets, which could replace Kyoto 
Protocol.202 However, COP-15 ended in disappointment, with no binding 
emissions reduction targets agreed to. This triggered the EU to find other 
ways of making the international regime commit to taking more stringent 
climate action, for example through the use of the market.203 
Following these failures, the EU has still been able to affect some parts of 
the rest of the world with its internal climate measures. This chapter will 
explore the most important ones, which have had the greatest effects outside 
the EU’s territory. 
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4.2 Shifting to Structural Leadership 
As has been described in the previous chapter, the EU has implemented 
internal climate measures that appear to be serving their purpose of being 
tools for achieving the EU’s 2020 climate targets. The Union has not, 
however, been very successful in its attempts to make other actors take 
similarly stringent climate change action by working through directional 
leadership. The strategy of leading by example in an attempt to inspire other 
nations to combat climate change or to set equally ambitious climate targets 
has, as it appears, been inadequate. 
The insufficiency of the EU’s directional leadership combined with the 
global institutional failure of the international climate regime has, from the 
EU’s point of view, led to a higher focus on integrating climate change into 
bilateral relations.204 Scholars have identified a shift in the EU’s leadership 
style, a shift from directional to structural leadership. Structural leadership 
requires that states use their material power, such as the size of their internal 
markets, to create incentives for other states to act in a particular, desired 
way. There are several examples of how the EU now tries to make other 
actors take action, instead of just inspiring them.205 
Instead of working at the international level, the EU is now increasingly 
using its political and economic influence to advance climate change 
objectives through its bilateral external relations.206 Several examples of 
how the EU has exercised its structural leadership will be examined in the 
following subsections, as well as the ways in which Canada has been 
influenced by such action. 
4.3 External Environmental Competence 
There is a broad legal basis for integrating environmental considerations in 
the EU’s external relations. First of all, in Article 21(2)(f) TEU, the pledge 
to “help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality 
of the environment” is included as one of the general objectives for the EU’s 
external action, to be pursued in all fields of EU external action.207 
Moreover, the EU’s internal environmental competence also allows for 
external action. The TFEU expressly states that the EU and its Member 
States are to cooperate with third countries as well as with competent 
international organizations and that such cooperation may result in 
agreements.208 
The TFEU furthermore allows for the EU to conclude international, bilateral 
or multilateral agreements even where the Treaties do not expressly set out 
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such competence – which for example is the case for the Energy Title209. In 
such a case it is required that the conclusion of an agreement is necessary to 
achieve a Treaty objective, such as environmental protection in Articles 3(3) 
TEU and 191(1) TFEU. Agreements that the EU have concluded are 
binding upon all Member States.210 
Moreover, Article 192(1) TFEU leaves the EU legislator to decide “what 
action is to be taken by the Union in order to achieve” the environmental 
objectives in Article 191 TFEU, which includes combating climate 
change.211 Consequently, the EU legislator can exercise its external 
environmental competence in other ways than just by concluding bilateral, 
multilateral or international agreements. A few illustrative examples will be 
examined below: the inclusion of the aviation industry in the EU ETS 
through the Aviation Directive; how the EU has banned CDM credits from 
certain projects that have been deemed to have an adverse impact on the 
environment; and lastly two elements of the Fuel Quality Directive – 
sustainability criteria for biofuels, and the proposal of default GHG intensity 
values for fossil fuels, the latter which has stirred some debate in Canada. 
4.4 Conditioning Internal Market Access 
on Climate Change Action by Third 
Countries 
4.4.1 The Aviation Directive 
With its introduction of the EU ETS, the EU has conditioned access to the 
internal market on actors participating in emissions trading, thereby aiming 
to internalize the externalities of GHG emissions, and ensuring that the 
polluter pays for the adverse impacts on the environment.212 The covered 
installations have to apply for a permit to emit GHGs.213 The Scheme has, 
however, been limited in scope and covered specific installations in order to 
reduce GHG emissions within the Member States, consequently affecting 
installations in the Member States only.214 
This was true until the adoption of the Aviation Directive215, which added 
the aviation sector to industries covered by the EU ETS, effective as of 
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January 1, 2012. The Directive is applicable to all flights arriving or 
departing from an EU airport.216 Airlines of all nationalities are hence 
required to surrender emission allowances to cover all parts of any given 
flight, which includes flight portions that occur outside EU airspace. The 
Aviation Directive is consequently a unilateral measure that the EU has 
adopted, which has significant implications for actors outside the Union. 
The implementation of the Directive was the EU’s response to the failure of 
regulating emissions from aviation at the international level. The Kyoto 
Protocol states that reductions of GHG emissions from the aviation sector 
shall be regulated working through the UN agency for aviation, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 217 but, at the time of 
the implementation of the Aviation Directive, the ICAO had not yet set any 
binding emission targets, only aspirational goals.218 Despite international 
negotiations on international aviation emissions, they remained uncontrolled 
under a legally binding agreement. As a consequence, the EU eventually 
took unilateral action, on the basis that unregulated aviation emissions 
would undermine other measures taken to combat climate change.219 The 
EU considers it critical that GHG emissions from aviation be limited in 
order for the Union to meet its 20-percent overall reduction target by 
2020.220 It is, however, clearly articulated in the Aviation Directive, that the 
EU still wants to see an international agreement on the reduction of GHG 
emissions from the aviation sector.221 
The Directive furthermore sets out one possibility for the Commission to 
adopt amendments to exclude certain flights from the EU ETS, provided 
that the country, from which the flights depart, has adopted measures for 
reducing climate change impacts of flights.222 Similarly, the Directive states 
that the Commission shall consider an amendment, should an agreement be 
reached on global measures to reduce GHG emissions from aviation 
activities.223 These are all indications that the EU does not attempt to 
substitute the international climate change regime, but rather that the 
intention is that the Aviation Directive serve as a complement and a 
temporary solution until negotiations at the international level result in a 
substantial agreement.224 
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The Aviation Directive has stirred much criticism from third countries, as it 
covers GHG emissions generated outside of EU airspace, which inter alia 
has resulted in the U.S. adopting an act prohibiting airlines from 
participating in the EU ETS.225 Furthermore, both Chinese and Indian 
airlines require government approval prior to participating in the EU ETS. 
China considered implementing restrictions on products originating from 
the EU and suspended orders by Chinese airlines of EU-built aircrafts.226 
More than twenty countries also adopted a joint declaration, in which they 
criticized the impacts of the Aviation Directive, as leading to market 
distortions and unfair competition, and urged the EU to cease the 
application of the Aviation Directive to airlines registered in third countries. 
Canada was not one of the countries signing the declaration.227 It did, 
however, join the high-profile CJEU case, in which the Directive was 
challenged by three U.S. airlines, on the grounds of its alleged violation of 
international law and illegal application to international aviation, which will 
be expanded on below. 
4.4.2 The ATA Case and Its Aftermath 
In 2010, the Air Transport Association of America with three of its 
members – United, Continental, and American Airlines – brought judicial 
review proceedings, claiming that the Aviation Directive resulted in a 
unilateral application of the EU ETS to non-EU airlines. Allegedly, as a 
consequence, various principles of customary international law as well as 
several treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol, and the EU–U.S. Open Skies 
Agreement228 had been violated. The National Airlines Council of Canada 
(NACC), representing Canada’s four largest passenger air carriers, joined 
the case, arguing that the EU–Canada Air Transport Agreement229 had many 
similarities with the Open Skies Agreement. The NACC specifically 
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Member States, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part, [2010], OJ, L 207/30), [EU–
Canada Agreement on Air Transport]. 
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highlighted that the agreement grants each party the right to implement 
appropriate measures to address the environmental impacts of air transport 
within its own jurisdiction230, and that the EU consequently had breached 
the bilateral agreement.231 The NACC furthermore stated that it was 
concerned with sustainability issues and that it was already working to 
reduce impacts on the environment that aviation may cause.232 
Questions were referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.233 In its 
judgment, the Court upheld the validity of the Directive and established that 
any aircraft operating in the territory of one of the Member States is subject 
to the unlimited jurisdiction of the EU.234 Consequently, the Court 
legitimized the use of a market-based measure applicable to commercial 
actors who are based abroad, and only partly operate in the EU’s internal 
market.235 
The CJEU furthermore stated that EU law allows the EU to permit 
commercial activity, in this case air transport, to be allowed to be carried out 
within the EU “only on condition that operators comply with the criteria that 
have been established by the European Union” [emphasis added]. The Court 
justified this interpretation of the Aviation Directive by stating that it was 
drafted with the purpose of reaching the high level of environmental 
protection that the EU is aiming for, which is established in Article 191(2) 
of the TFEU. The Court stressed that this is especially important under 
circumstances where such environmental objectives originate from an 
international agreement such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol,236 as 
in the case of the Aviation Directive. 
The CJEU’s judgment proved to be very controversial, as it entailed wide 
implications for the global climate change regime. By interpreting the 
Aviation Directive as an internal regulation as opposed to an external 
environmental measure,237 the Court, in essence, justified the EU’s 
regulatory actions on the basis of the high environmental protection 
standards that the EU has established.238 The ruling can furthermore be 
interpreted as the CJEU legitimizing the EU’s leading role in combating 
climate change.239 Perhaps even more importantly, the ruling implies the 
justification of a regional response to global institutional failure on the 
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grounds of an environmental objective established by the international 
climate change regime.240 
After facing extensive criticism, the EU decided to “stop the clock” 
regarding the implementation of the inclusion of international aviation in the 
EU ETS, by amending the ETS Directive to allow for exemption of 
international flights arriving and departing from the EU during 2012. The 
EU Commissioner for Climate Action announced the EU’s new intentions 
following the ICAO Council meeting in November of 2012, where the 
Council members decided to move forward the plans of establishing a 
market-based mechanism at the international level.241 The ICAO’s 
intentions were further confirmed in a resolution adopted by the ICAO 
Assembly in October 2013, where guiding principles for the design and 
implementation of these measures were agreed upon.242 
4.5 Banning of CDM Credits from 
Industrial Gas Projects 
The EU has furthermore demonstrated its strong leadership in international 
climate change action by using the size and importance of the EU ETS to 
control, or at least significantly affect, the international carbon market. With 
the intention of doing so, the EU no longer accepts offset credits from 
certain projects outside its borders, typically in advanced developing 
countries,243 for ETS participants to be counted towards ETS compliance.244  
The ban of these credits must be seen in the context of the EU ETS being 
connected to the two Kyoto mechanisms Joint Implementation (JI) and the 
CDM. This means that installations covered by the EU ETS can buy and use 
credits from the CDM and JI in order to meet their emissions targets.245 
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These project-based flexibility mechanisms were set up under the Kyoto 
Protocol for developed countries to use in order to meet their reduction 
commitments. JI allows for transferal of emission reduction units between 
Annex I parties,246 while the CDM concerns emissions trading between a 
developed nation and a developing nation.247 This way, additional 
incentives are created for businesses to invest in projects aiming at reducing 
emissions outside of the EU and the Scheme’s cost-effectiveness is 
enhanced. The EU ETS thus provides opportunities for reducing GHG 
emissions in other parts of the world, through the use of CDM and JI.248 
Not all CDM credits are eligible under the EU ETS. As of May 4, 2013, 
CDM credits from certain industrial gas projects can no longer be used for 
compliance under the EU ETS.249 The reason for the ban is that those 
projects stimulate an over-production of powerful GHGs, which are then 
destroyed, thus producing a high amount of cheap carbon credits. Allowing 
these credits could potentially create a perverse incentive to continue 
producing, or even to increase the production of, these GHGs.250 
As the EU ETS is dominating the global carbon market,251 it is expected that 
this decision will affect the demand for credits from industrial gas projects 
under the CDM.252 From the EU’s point of view, this is a step towards the 
Union’s wish to bring about a reform of the CDM. The EU does not believe 
that CDM in its current form, as a mechanism of purely offsetting character, 
will contribute to a reduction of emissions sufficient to keep global warming 
below the agreed 2-degree target.253 
4.6 The Fuel Quality Directive 
4.6.1 Overview 
The Fuel Quality Directive254 (FQD) aims to reduce GHG emissions 
associated with the production and use of transportation fuel. It was recently 
amended by the Fuel Specification Directive255, as part of the 2009 Climate 
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and Energy Package. The amended FQD now requires fuel suppliers to 
reduce the GHG intensity of all gasoline, diesel and biofuels used for road 
transport by 6 percent between 2010 and 2020.256 The EU recognizes that 
the reduction of GHG emissions from transport fuels is significant in order 
for the Union to meet its reduction targets, as transport fuels contribute 
significantly to overall GHG emissions in the EU. The objective of the FQD 
is hence to encourage the use of low-carbon transport fuels.257 
Below, two elements of the FQD which will have implications for third 
countries will be expanded on, as these are attempts of the EU to influence 
third countries and to spur climate change action beyond its borders. The 
first one is the sustainability criteria for biofuels, mentioned above, which 
has been introduced in both the Renewable Energy Directive and the FQD. 
The second one is a proposed revision of Article 7a, which would assign a 
higher GHG intensity value to fuels derived from natural bitumen (oil 
sands) than those derived from conventional crude oil, against which 
Canada has been lobbying very aggressively.258 The argument is that the 
categorization will have a discriminatory effect against Canadian oil, as the 
higher GHG intensity value will make it less competitive on the EU market. 
4.6.2 Introduction of Sustainability Criteria for 
Biofuels 
The first example is the aforementioned sustainability criteria for biofuels 
that were introduced through the 2009 Climate and Energy Package. 
Scholars have suggested that these criteria are a way of the EU to influence 
the international debate on biofuels.259 The issue with an increased use of 
biofuels, which are fuels derived from plant materials, is that they might 
have negative impacts on the environment, in relation to inter alia changes 
in land use, where for example tropical forests are cleared in favor of 
producing biofuel feedstocks.260 
As mentioned above,261 one of the EU’s climate targets is the renewables 
target of 20 percent by 2020, which refers to the aim that 20 percent of the 
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EU’s overall energy consumption should stem from renewable sources. In 
this target, a specific target is included for the transport sector, that by 2020, 
at least 10 percent of the final energy consumption in the sector should 
come from renewable energy,262 including, but not limited to, biofuels.263 
For this reason, and in order to provide measures to reach the set target, the 
2009 Climate and Energy Package has introduced sustainability criteria for 
the production of some biofuels through the Renewable Energy Directive.264 
The language of the sustainability-criteria provisions is, however, reiterated 
in the Fuel Specification Directive. Only biofuels meeting the set 
sustainability criteria can be counted towards the reduction target.265 The 
ultimate objective of the sustainability criteria is hence to make sure that the 
increased use of biofuels, which is encouraged through the renewable-
energy target, does not result in the destruction of biodiverse lands. By 
implementing sustainability criteria, the EU can consequently control which 
biofuels qualify against the target, thereby incentivizing the production of 
biofuels in a manner that does not deleteriously affect the environment and 
ensuring the sustainability of biofuel production.266 
Sustainability criteria apply both to biofuels produced within the EU, and to 
biofuels imported from third countries,267 meaning that access to the EU’s 
internal market for international actors is conditioned on their products 
meeting EU standards. 
4.6.3 Proposed Default GHG Intensity Values 
for Fossil Fuels 
The second example from the amended FQD is a proposed implementing 
measure under Article 7a(5)(a) of the FQD, which is to do with the 
calculation of the GHG intensity of fossil fuels. The methodology for 
calculating the GHG intensity of biofuels is included in the FQD,268 while 
that of fossil fuels and electric energy has not yet been established. A draft 
for a directive laying down the calculation method has been proposed by the 
European Commission through the Committee on Fuel Quality,269 and it 
has, as mentioned above, been heavily criticized by the Canadian 
government.270 
                                               
262 Renewable Energy Directive, supra note 173, Article 3(4) (cf. Preamble, Recital 18). 
263 Ibid, Article 2(a). 
264 Ibid, Articles 17-19. 
265 Fuel Specification Directive, supra note 255, Article 7b(1). 
266 Ibid, Preamble, Recitals 10-11. 
267 Ibid, Article 7c(3). 
268 Fuel Quality Directive, supra note 254, Annex IV. 
269 Directorate General for Climate Action & The Committee on Fuel Quality, Draft 
Commission Directive ../…/EU of […] laying down calculation methods and reporting 
requirements pursuant to Directive 98/70/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels, December 2, 2011, 
D016937/03 (Draft implementing measure/act) in dossier CMTD(2011)1446, [Commission 
Directive Draft 2011]. 
270 See for example “Fuel Quality Directive”, online: Natural Resources Canada 
<https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media-room/backgrounders/2012/3239>, accessed May 3, 2014. 
 
 
50 
The GHG intensity of fuels will be calculated on a life-cycle basis,271 
thereby making sure that not only the emissions generated from combustion 
are considered, but also the emissions from the extraction, processing and 
distribution of fuels. Consequently, the whole life cycle, from production to 
combustion, of products such as gasoline and diesel is accounted for. 
Total GHG emissions are to be calculated based on default values set for 
different fossil fuels’ GHG intensity, and in this aspect, the proposal 
differentiates between transport fuels based on the types of “feedstock”272 
from which they are produced. The categories in the proposed directive 
include conventional crude oil, natural bitumen (oil sands), and shale oil. 
The different types are assigned default GHG intensity values based on the 
average, or most likely, value for that feedstock.273 The reason for the 
differentiation is that the extraction and refining processes associated with 
the production of the different types of fuels require different amounts of 
energy. Consequently, a production process that generates high GHG 
emission levels will be reflected in higher GHG intensity values for the 
products produced. For example, the extraction and processing of bitumen 
from the oil sands is generally more energy intensive than conventional oil 
production due to the heat required to separate heavy bitumen from the 
surrounding sand and rock, as well as the refining process.274 Fuels derived 
from the oil sands will therefore be assigned a higher GHG intensity value 
than those derived from conventional crude oil, which has given rise to 
criticism in Canada. 
Canada has lobbied heavily against this proposal, and the federal 
government has threatened to take the EU to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) if the directive is passed. The former Canadian Minister of Natural 
Resources, Joe Oliver (the Conservative Party), dismissed the proposed 
directive as being based on incomplete information and criticized the lack of 
a comprehensive scientific study of the GHG intensity of conventional 
crude oil.275 The Minister furthermore argued that the calculation methods 
were not based on scientific facts and that the measures are discriminatory 
against Canadian oil sands fuel, as the assigned higher GHG intensity value 
would render oil sands crude oil uncompetitive in the EU market.276 Natural 
Resources Canada277 commissioned a study to evaluate the FQD’s default 
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GHG intensity values, which ended up supporting the Canadian 
government’s arguments.278 
One plausible underlying reason for this is the importance of the oil industry 
for the Canadian economy, and that the government sees the proposed 
amendment to the FQD as a threat to Canada’s plans to export fuels derived 
from the oils sands to the EU. The oil industry accounts for about 8 percent 
of total GDP,279 and energy products, including oil and natural gas, is the 
largest category of export goods, at 24 percent of total exports.280 The oil 
and gas sector does, however, account for 25 percent of Canada’s total GHG 
emissions, and is the sector that emits the most GHGs of all.281 The federal 
government still has no emission regulations in place for that sector,282 
which is illustrative of its approach to climate change and environmental 
protection, and their reasoning that such action cannot be taken at the 
expense of the Canadian economy. 
The proposed directive which amends the FQD has been considerably 
delayed due to massive lobbying, and is still not implemented.283 In May 
2012, the European Parliament declared its support for the FQD and insisted 
that fuels derived from the oil sands should be assigned a separate default 
GHG intensity value.284 The Commission has stated that the Directive needs 
further work, and an impact assessment study was concluded and approved, 
but not published in 2013.285 
4.7 Reflections 
With its structural leadership strategy, the EU has taken its climate change 
action one step further. Several examples show that the EU’s internal 
climate measures have intentional spill-over effects on third countries, 
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which are not always appreciated – clearly illustrated by the ATA case. As 
explained in chapter two, climate change litigation is on the rise, and the 
ATA case exemplifies how the ultimate decision for the application of a 
climate change measure was left to the courts, in the form of the CJEU, to 
decide. In this case, the Court was persistent and agreed with the EU on 
what right it had to legislate with implications on other jurisdictions. One 
may question whether such legislation infringes on other states’ sovereignty, 
but the Court interpreted it to be a question about the EU’s right to regulate 
terms for access to its own territory. Ultimately, what has happened is that 
the international debate on how to regulate GHG emissions from 
international aviation was transferred to a question for the CJEU to decide 
on, instead of politicians representing different countries and their interests. 
In this case though, the CJEU did not play the “gap-filling” role, as is the 
case for some climate litigation, when it comes to making up for policy 
gaps. The ATA case only confirms that the EU had adequate jurisdiction to 
legislate as it did. The CJEU thus recognized and affirmed the EU’s ability 
to unilaterally control GHG emissions outside of its territory, justifying its 
decision on the basis of the EU’s high standards of environmental 
protection. 
Despite the judgment, the EU still decided to cease application of the 
Aviation Directive to international flights, after the ICAO had announced 
that emissions from international aviation was going to be dealt with. 
Currently, only intra-EU flights are covered. This means that, in order to 
keep up with its leadership ambitions, the EU will have to follow up on 
these plans to make sure that some kind of agreement or regulations will be 
implemented concerning these emissions. If not, the Aviation Directive’s 
initial scope should be put back in place, otherwise the EU’s credibility as a 
leader in progressive climate change action would be questioned.  
By joining the claimants’ case, the NACC demonstrated its disapproval with 
the Aviation Directive’s application. The NACC’s approach reflects that of 
the Government of Canada, claiming that it already has measures in place to 
deal with adverse impacts of aviation on the environment and that they are 
leery of external advice. The aviation industry clearly wants to protect its 
economic interests at the expense of the environment, and this stance is also 
reflected in the Canadian oil industry’s disapproval of the proposed default 
GHG intensity values for fossil fuels. The purpose of default values is to 
acquire more accurate calculations for different fossil fuel GHG emissions. 
Several studies have shown that crude oil from oil sands affect the 
environment much more adversely than conventional crude oil. What the oil 
industry is concerned about in its opposition to the proposal, however, is 
that its products will be less competitive on the EU market, resulting in less 
profit. Currently, most Canadian oil is exported to the United States, and not 
to the EU, so this would not be an immediate problem for the industry, yet it 
cannot see beyond potential business expansion, and to what could 
hopefully be a tool for stabilizing the climate. 
What the oil industry should perceive is the potential to develop new 
technology for its crude production, to make it less GHG-intensive. By 
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innovating new production methods, Canadian oil producers could 
potentially arise as a competitive choice on the EU market. The intention of 
the proposed amendment to the FQD is to create incentives for fuel 
producers to stimulate more environmentally friendly production. Since the 
EU is a big importer of energy, the oil industry has the opportunity to create 
a competitive choice by lowering the GHG intensity of its production. 
By implementing sustainability criteria for biofuels, the EU aims to ensure 
that its climate laws on renewable energy, which essentially encourage an 
increased use of biofuels, do not just result in an environmental issue in one 
area (too little renewable energy being used in the EU) being shifted to 
another environmental issue in another area (the destruction of biodiverse 
lands elsewhere in order to produce biofuels for use in the EU). This type of 
regulation shows that the EU is concerned, not only with its own climate 
targets and performance, but with climate action on a global scale. 
As seen in the examples of climate action taken by the EU as part of its 
directional leadership, trying to inspire other actors may not always be 
enough. In this chapter, some of the EU’s climate action expressing more of 
a structural leadership has been highlighted. It can be established that by 
such action, such as implementing the Aviation Directive and sustainability 
criteria for biofuels, makes other states act more environmentally friendly, 
whether they want to or not, at least in selected areas. This is clearly a step 
in the right direction when it comes to combating climate change. The 
measures explored in this chapter target all actors who want access to the 
EU’s internal market, however, the EU has also started to integrate climate 
change concerns into its bilateral agreements, hence opening up the 
opportunity to set specific objectives for selected countries. This strategy 
will be examined in the next chapter. 
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5 Conditioning Agreements on 
Climate Change Action 
5.1 Conditionality Clauses in External 
Agreements 
Conditionality clauses can be included in bilateral or multilateral 
agreements and then function as tools for achieving a political goal. When it 
seems that the lack of political will is a major obstacle in combating climate 
change in Canada, this type of legal construction can be a possibility for the 
EU to exert pressure.286 
A contract clause can be drafted in a way that gives the parties a possibility 
to terminate the contract or agreement should one of them not fulfill their 
obligations according to that same contract or agreement, and this is an 
opportunity for the EU to integrate environmental and climate change 
concerns into its external relations.287 Since the early 1990’s, the EU has 
been using conditionality clauses in its external bilateral agreements for 
different purposes. These clauses are tools for the EU to inter alia extend 
the respect for human rights and other democratic principles. This can be 
done by integrating the ideas into the agreement and making them a ground 
for termination of the contract.288 
Human rights clauses are quite common in the EU’s bilateral agreements, in 
which they are used to condition the benefits of the agreements on the 
beneficiary upholding human rights.289 For this type of conditionality 
clauses to function as an efficient tool, however, the agreement has to be of 
importance to the other party.290 This strategy works well with agreements 
on foreign aid, or official development aid, which grant the transfer of 
resources to a developing country. The question is whether this strategy 
could be used, and to what extent it already is used, by the EU to encourage 
climate change action in developed countries, in the same way it is used for 
the upholding of human rights in developing countries. This will be 
examined in the following subsections, as well as an overview of how the 
EU has integrated environmental concerns into its trade policy. 
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5.2 Environmental Integration into EU 
Trade Policy 
There are several examples of environmental integration into the EU’s trade 
policy, focusing primarily on the Union’s relations with developing 
countries. First of all, the EU has a system for tariff removal for developing 
countries called Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which allows 
exporters to pay less or no duties on their exports to the EU.291 The standard 
GSP arrangement allows for partial or full removal of tariffs of two thirds of 
all product categories, while the enhanced version, the GSP+292, means full 
tariff removal for countries that ratify and implement certain international 
conventions concerning human and labor rights, environment and good 
governance.293 Among the conventions concerning the environment, the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are included,294 thus requiring GSP+ 
beneficiaries to ratify and comply with their respective targets. As a result, 
the EU gives developing countries an incentive to implement inter alia more 
stringent environmental policies, by working through trade measures.295 
Two different types of conditionality can be identified – positive and 
negative. The GSP+ arrangement is an example of positive conditionality, 
as participating countries are given additional benefits, as opposed to 
negative conditionality, which is used under the general GSP arrangement, 
where preferences are withdrawn in the case of non-compliance.296 
The adoption of the EU’s new approach to integrating environmental 
provisions into its free trade agreements (FTAs) is another example of 
environmental integration in EU trade policy.297 In the Renewed EU 
Sustainable Development Strategy from 2006, it is emphasized that 
international trade and investment should be used increasingly as tools for 
achieving sustainable development, and that the EU should use inter alia 
bilateral trade agreements when working with its trading partners to 
improve environmental standards.298 Before that time, environmental 
provisions were not systematically included in the EU’s FTAs, and if they 
were, they were framed in very general terms.299 The inclusion of these 
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Morgera, ed, The External Environmental Policy of the European Union (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 174, at 174, [Žvelc]. 
296 Ibid at 177. 
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types of provisions in recent FTAs is a step in the right direction, however, 
it is not enough to have the objectives in writing, they must be complied 
with as well. The Commission has stressed that it is important that the EU 
follows up on the mechanisms implemented in the agreements in order to 
ensure that they are used effectively, objectives are fulfilled, and that 
sustainable development is promoted in the intended way.300 
Examples of such environmental provisions can be found in the EU’s 
relations with developing countries, where cooperation clauses devoted to 
climate change recently have been included, inter alia in FTAs.301 
Cooperation clauses can be drafted in different ways, but generally require 
that the parties develop and strengthen their cooperation on different issues 
in the environmental field. In 2010, after the second revision of the Cotonou 
Agreement302, which is the world’s largest economic and political 
framework for cooperation between the EU and developing countries, 
climate change was identified as one of the objectives of the partnership 
between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries.303 
Furthermore, a full article dedicated to climate change cooperation was 
added, in which the Parties recognize climate change as a serious global 
challenge, commit to supporting mitigation and adaptation efforts, and raise 
the political profile of climate change in development cooperation. Specific 
cooperation activities such as integrating climate change into development 
strategies and poverty reduction efforts are identified as well.304 
Framing causes such as democratic principles or environmental protection 
as conditional clauses could, however, potentially give rise to issues in the 
case of suspension of a trade agreement on these grounds. It could be 
subject to legal recourse in the dispute settlement system of the WTO. The 
WTO dispute panel would have to assess whether the EU had the right not 
to honor its commitments according to the bilateral agreement as a 
consequence of the other party not upholding human rights, certain 
environmental standards, or whatever the clause in question may concern.305 
Andreas Moberg suggests that in the case of the EU suspending terms of a 
trade agreement that are beneficial to the other party, sanctions will most 
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likely be taken by that other party, even though the EU had acted in favor 
of, for example, human rights. The situation may, however, be different, 
according to Moberg, in the case of a trade agreement between the EU and a 
more equal trade partner.306 This could potentially be the case in a bilateral 
agreement with Canada based on climate change action. The following 
subsections will examine how two important agreements between the EU 
and Canada have implemented environmental provisions. 
5.3 Environmental Provisions in EU–
Canada Bilateral Agreements 
5.3.1 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement 
As far as Canada is concerned, a new FTA has been concluded between the 
EU and Canada. The EU is Canada’s second most important trading partner, 
after the United States, while Canada was the EU’s twelfth largest trading 
partner in 2012. The new comprehensive trade agreement between the EU 
and Canada is expected to increase their bilateral trade by almost 23 
percent.307 This could be an opportunity for the EU to promote climate 
change action in its bilateral relations with a country that has shown poor 
climate change performance in recent years, by using the size and 
importance of the Union’s market and economy.  
A political agreement on the key elements of a free trade agreement (the 
CETA) between Canada and the EU was reached between European 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso and Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper on October 18, 2013, and an agreement in principle was 
signed.308 The legal text of the agreement is yet to be finalized, but reports 
on the negotiated outcomes indicate that the FTA will remove over 99 
percent of tariffs between the EU and Canada and hence create significant 
new market access opportunities in services and investment.309 CETA will 
include a chapter on trade and sustainable development as well as one on 
trade and the environment. This is the first time that Canada agrees to 
include chapters on these areas in an FTA,310 perhaps as a sign of the 
importance of its relations with the EU. The agreement states that 
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investment and trade relations should not develop at the expense of the 
environment; that economic growth and environmental protection should 
not be mutually exclusive.311 This can be contrasted with the Canadian 
government’s regular stance, which has been described above, and which is 
more of a reverse argument – that environmental protection measures should 
not be implemented at the expense of the environment312 and this is 
interesting progress. There is, however, no indication of climate change 
specifically being addressed in the agreement. 
Furthermore, Canada and the EU have, in the agreement, committed to 
maintain a high level of environmental protection and to effectively enforce 
domestic environmental laws, as well as to provide domestic sanctions or 
remedies for violations of environmental laws. Any disputes will be settled 
through dispute resolution; however, the CETA will not include any 
penalties or trade sanctions in the case of non-compliance.313 
5.3.2 The Agreement on Air Transport  
In the Agreement on Air Transport between the EU and Canada, which is 
the most ambitious air transport agreement between the EU and a major 
partner in the world so far,314 the parties acknowledge the importance of 
environmental protection in relation to aviation.315 Both parties have agreed 
to cooperate closely in order to mitigate the effects that aviation activities 
might have on climate change316 and the Agreement includes one article 
devoted to the environment.317 The approach is a little different in this 
article, however, as it states that environmental measures concerning 
aviation should only be implemented after an evaluation of how they might 
adversely affect “the exercise of rights contained in [the] Agreement”318. 
The phrasing indicates that even though the Parties have affirmed the 
importance of protecting the environment, aviation commercial activities are 
of primary concern. 
5.4 Reflections 
Inspiration appears to not having been enough to influence other countreis 
to commit to climate change action, and more stringent measures, such as 
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the inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU ETS have met extensive 
criticism. Ultimately, the EU ceased the intended application of the Aviation 
Directive. Another method of influencing countries to increase efforts to 
mitigate climate change is by working through bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. In this last chapter, I have looked into how environmental and 
climate change clauses are used in the EU’s current bilateral agreements, as 
the third method of legal measures available to the EU to exert pressure on 
third countries, after secondary legislation and case law. The question is 
whether these types of clauses could be used for additional purposes, such 
as meeting certain climate targets or improving climate performance. Using 
legal constructions such as conditionality clauses in bilateral agreements 
opens up for a new strategy of “targeting” third countries one by one, as 
opposed to trying to inspire an unspecified global community to pursue 
more stringent climate policy. 
The GSP+ system is an example of how conditionality on environmental 
action is used as a means of bringing pressure on states perhaps less likely 
to use their resources for environmental protection purposes such as 
mitigating climate change. This strategy is different from that of the use of 
conditionality clauses such as human rights clauses, as states are rewarded 
for taking action with something they did not previously have, whereas 
failure to uphold human rights in the latter case would result in withdrawal 
of existing benefits. Even though these two arrangements represent different 
legal approaches and situations, the different ways of obtaining a desired 
side effect can be observed. As indicated by Moberg, this type of 
conditionality only works on the presumption that the agreement is of high 
importance to the other party.  
For the purpose of this thesis, I wanted to discuss whether conditionality 
clauses could be used to pressure other industrialized countries to commit to 
take more stringent climate action. In the new CETA between Canada and 
the EU, Canada has agreed to incorporate chapters that deal with 
sustainability and environmental concerns in relation to trade. The EU is the 
second most important trading partner for Canada, while Canada is the EU’s 
twelfth most important trading partner, which could be used to the EU’s 
advantage when it comes to negotiating more stringent terms for Canada. 
The legal text for the provisions that have been agreed upon has not been 
finalized, but there are indications that they will be phrased quite vaguely, 
and as aspirational or desirable goals, rather than stringent terms. 
Furthermore, climate change specifically does not seem to have been 
touched upon, “only” sustainable development as well as the environment in 
general. This is in line with the EU’s aforementioned environmental 
integration principle of Article 11 TFEU, which requires that environmental 
protection be an inherent part in all EU policy. Considering the importance 
for Canada of trading with the EU, however, this is an area in which the EU 
could have pushed the climate change issue specifically a little more. As 
mentioned, the final agreement text has yet to be published, but noting the 
reluctance that Canada has shown in the past years, it does not seem likely 
that the federal government would agree to condition an FTA on climate 
change action cooperation. On the other hand, taking into account the EU’s 
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leadership ambitions in these issues, CETA would be a good opportunity for 
the Union to set a standard on what climate change performance is needed, 
or to ensure that sanctions were issued in the case of non-compliance with 
the environmental provisions. It is most definitely uplifting to see that 
Canada for the first time has agreed to include provisions on environmental 
concerns in an FTA; however, to stress the importance of mitigating climate 
change, the issue should be specifically mentioned in the agreement’s 
preamble or similar. 
What this chapter has aimed to illustrate is that bilateral and multilateral 
agreements can be used for integrating climate change concerns into the 
EU’s external relations. Working through bilateral agreements is perhaps a 
more lenient manner for the EU to integrate climate change concerns into its 
relations with third countries, and an approach that leaves room for more 
negotiation, so that both the EU and its contracting party are satisfied with 
the arrangement. 
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6 Concluding Analysis 
6.1 Different Approaches to Mitigating 
Climate Change 
The objective of this thesis has been to examine legal methods available to 
the EU to influence Canada to pursue climate change action in times of 
institutional failure of the international climate regime. First, my 
examination has mapped the EU’s and Canada’s respective climate change 
approaches. The EU considers the environment to be of high importance, 
which is evident by how the Union finds ways to integrate environmental 
concerns into different parts of its policies. This stance has also been 
established in EU primary legislation in the form of the environmental 
integration principle, which explicitly requires that environmental 
protection be integrated into all Union policy and activity. Mitigating 
climate change is an evident part of environmental protection, but the EU 
has still chosen to explicitly include combating climate change as one of its 
objectives for its environmental policy, next to the protection of human 
health,319 consequently showing that the Union considers inter alia the 
reduction of GHG emissions to be of high importance. 
No similar approach can be distinguished in Canadian legislation. The 
development of Canadian climate policy shows no sign of any intention or 
desire to promote environmental protection as highly as the EU does. 
Instead, the government has clearly articulated that while it appreciates the 
need for a speedy response to global warming, no environmental protection 
measure can come at the expense of the Canadian economy. A study of 
Canadian climate policy during the past 20 years further demonstrates that 
the Government of Canada has adjusted Canada’s climate targets several 
times, after having realized that the target in question would not be met. 
What was perhaps an ambitious reduction target from the beginning was not 
followed by similarly stringent legal measures to ensure its achievement. It 
is evident that the Canadian government is trying to avoid regulating 
emissions from the, for the economy, important oil and gas sector by 
choosing a climate change action approach that allows for prioritizing 
emission reductions from other sectors. This method allows for some visible 
climate change action without dealing with environmental protection that 
could negatively affect the Canadian economy. 
The Canadian approach to mitigating climate change is corresponds with the 
idea of the tragedy of the commons, one of the concepts of which is that an 
actor will overexploit a common resource, if it is financially rewarding for 
him or her. The conclusion is that economic incentives are needed in order 
to change that behavior. I have looked at three different measures through 
which the EU is trying to substitute for the lack of effective international 
climate law: EU legislation with external impact, EU case law, and bilateral 
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agreements. The ultimate question is now whether these means provide 
sufficient incentives to act on climate change, and whether they have given 
the same effect, or if one is stronger than the other? 
6.2 Spurring Climate Action beyond the 
EU’s External Borders 
6.2.1 Substituting for Climate Inaction through 
Secondary Legislation 
Through its secondary legislation, the EU has imposed requirements on 
external actors; in essence substituting for inaction on climate change issues 
elsewhere by demanding that industries fulfill certain criteria to get access 
to the EU market. The introduction of sustainability criteria for biofuels and 
the proposal for implementing GHG intensity values for fossil fuels show 
that the EU appreciates that climate change cannot be regulated in isolation; 
that several aspects have to be taken into consideration if emissions are to be 
reduced efficiently. These two measures both take into consideration the 
whole life cycle of fuels, that is, how much GHG emissions they actually 
generate during all stages, not only at the time of combustion. The measures 
point to a genuine environmental protection approach, which is needed in 
order to stabilize GHG emissions. It is not enough to target one phase of the 
fuels’ life cycles. Rather, in order to effectively mitigate climate change, a 
realistic approach which recognizes all aspects of emission generation, is 
critical. 
Through this type of secondary legislation, the EU imposes its own 
environmental standards on non-EU industries by making it mandatory to 
comply with set sustainability criteria for biofuels or apply intensity values 
for fossil fuels. Thereby third countries are forced to take some kind of 
climate change mitigation measures if they want access to the EU market.  
6.2.2 Legitimizing Regulatory Influence through 
CJEU Case Law 
CJEU has shown persistence in supporting EU legislation, clearly visible in 
the ATA case, where the Court legitimized the EU’s regulation of aviation 
activities which generate GHG emissions outside of EU airspace. The ATA 
case sends a strong signal that the EU is ready to fight for its cause of 
maintaining high environmental performance standards, however, due to 
political pressure, the EU decided to cease the application of the Aviation 
Directive to international flights. The decision was taken based on the 
announcement that the ICAO will ensure that GHG emissions from aviation 
be regulated at the international level soon, a statement that was confirmed 
by a subsequent ICAO Assembly Resolution, which sets out guiding 
principles for such measures. It is important that the EU follows up on these 
plans, and reestablishes the original application of the Aviation Directive. 
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Especially if the ICAO’s are executed improperly, if the EU wants to 
maintain its leadership role on climate action, and if its secondary 
legislation is to remain a credible tool on exerting pressure on third 
countries. 
6.2.3 Conditioning Agreements to Achieve 
Political Goals 
Conditionality or cooperation clauses in agreements can be used as tools for 
achieving political goals, hence, possibly a useful means of forcing Canada 
to take climate change action that it would be unwilling to take in the 
absence of clear incentives other than minor environmental benefits. When 
drafting an agreement, both parties have the opportunity to negotiate terms 
favorable to them; the contractual freedom thus opens up for creative and 
flexible solutions to bring on a certain behavior. In addition, the 
consequences of a breach of the agreement can be chosen so that both 
parties are content and willing to comply. 
Working through contract clauses hence provides the opportunity to adjust 
the terms for each single contracting state. In essence, a contractual 
obligation to mitigate climate change can be created. Since both parties have 
been given the chance to deliver its opinions on the matter through 
negotiation, the chances of conditionality or cooperation clauses on climate 
change being complied with are potentially higher than those of obligations 
that the EU unilaterally has imposed on third countries through its internal 
legislation being met. 
6.2.4 Effectiveness of the Measures Examined 
Measures such as the Aviation Directive or the sustainability criteria for 
biofuel target unspecified external actors, as they target every actor seeking 
to access the EU’s internal market in one way or another. There is no room 
for “customizing”. In this aspect, cooperation or conditionality clauses in 
bilateral agreements are possibly a more flexible way of working, however, 
perhaps not as efficient, as they each target a smaller group. It is also 
important to include effective sanctions, in case of non-compliance, since 
the inability to deal with non-compliers has been a major problem within the 
international climate regime. 
A important question is whether it is feasible to condition bilateral 
agreements with developed countries on climate change? Could CETA, for 
example, have included climate change conditions in addition to addressing 
the environment in general? First, we can establish that climate change 
action can be costly, and it is in the EU’s interest that domestic firms are not 
put at a competitive disadvantage while working to reduce emissions. If 
they knew that industries from outside the EU would not be held to the same 
standards, they would have much less of an incentive to comply with the 
EU’s climate change measures. In this regard, an international agreement 
setting international standards to ensure that other countries also implement 
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regulations leading to similarly stringent, and costly, climate change 
mitigation measures is of high importance to the EU. In the meantime, 
however, bilateral agreements can be an effective way of working on a 
state-by-state basis.  
Going back to the feasibility question, it is evident that CETA is an FTA of 
great importance to both the EU and Canada. An increase of Canadian 
products in the EU will lead to an increase in competition between Canadian 
and EU businesses, hence making it important for EU industries that 
Canadian industries are subject to the same standards, as they would 
otherwise be disadvantaged. Specifying certain performance or production 
criteria, related to climate change mitigation, in such bilateral agreements 
could help EU industries maintain competitiveness without lowering their 
environmental protection standards. 
6.3 The Different Measures Compared 
Comparing these different legal approaches, the secondary legislation, the 
case law, and the agreements, it can be established that they all have a 
legitimate purpose, and can all be effective measures in mitigating climate 
change if used wisely. Secondary legislation can target a larger group and 
substitute for inaction at the international level quite effectively, provided 
that it is carefully designed so that it can withstand court proceedings if 
challenged. If so, the result is a solid climate measure, legitimized by the 
Court, that can send a strong legal message to states more reluctant to taking 
climate action that it is time to act, and that if they want to get access to the 
EU market they will have to accept that business cannot come at the 
expense of environmental protection. 
Working through bilateral agreements may be a legal method that is 
narrower in scope. However, it can result in a stringent means of exerting 
pressure, provided that the agreement in question is of great enough 
importance for the contracting states, and there is a greater opportunity of 
“tailoring” the terms and drafting the agreement in a more specific way in 
order to achieve the desired effect. 
Canada has been reluctant to the EU exercising regulatory influence on third 
countries, and has criticized both the Aviation Directive and the proposed 
GHG intensity values for fossil fuels, ultimately based on the argument that 
complying with such measures will damage the Canadian economy or put 
Canadian companies at a disadvantage. With an FTA such as the new 
CETA, Canada and the EU have the benefit of being able to negotiate over 
what climate change action that is needed, and due to the importance of EU 
as a trading partner for Canada, this is an opportunity for the EU to make 
demands on Canada to deliver on its presumed commitment to mitigating 
climate change. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
I believe that an overarching international framework is needed in order to 
coordinate action on climate change taken by different countries, as well as 
to establish some kind of performance standard, which could possibly be 
different for different countries, based on their capabilities. However, this 
top-down approach has to be complemented by effective compliance 
mechanisms. If compliance cannot be assured, it will be difficult to regain 
and retain confidence in an international climate regime. If non-compliers 
are not dealt with properly, one can question what incentives there are for 
complying, or even remaining a party of such frameworks. 
It is nevertheless a fact that different countries have different capabilities of 
combating climate change, and due to the urgency of climate change 
mitigation, an international top-down approach could be followed by 
bottom-up approaches to ensure effective regulation. Conditionality or 
coordination clauses on climate change in bilateral or multilateral 
agreements could constitute such an approach, and guarantee that more 
capable countries, such as Canada, are pushed to contribute a little bit more. 
In conclusion, the global challenge that climate change imposes on all 
countries calls for an international response, and where such a response fails 
several legal methods are available for single actors to exert pressure on 
others. The EU has been using secondary legislation supported by CJEU 
case law in innovative ways, and has complemented such action with 
environmental or climate change clauses in bilateral agreements, thus living 
up to its integration principle that environmental protection concerns should 
be an inherent part of all EU actions and policies. This is a progressive 
approach, not to mention an imperative one, considering the adverse 
consequences of climate change that we are starting to face. We are what is 
wrong. Climate change is a collective-action problem, and it is not enough if 
only a few countries take action to mitigate climate change. Furthermore, 
countries cannot pick and choose to act in areas that they are more 
comfortable with. There is no room for hesitation or delay. We must make it 
right. And we must act now. For reluctant countries, incentives have to be 
created. The EU has found a way of mixing a top-down and a bottom-up 
approach and it is my hope that it will steer Canada in the right direction. 
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